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ABSTRACT
Ideas and methodologies of lean product development were developed into tools and processes that help
product development organizations improve their performances. The definition of waste in product
development processes was re-examined and developed into a frugal set to cover all types of waste in product
development processes through preliminary case studies. Value stream mapping (VSM) was optimized for
measuring the waste indicators in product development processes. Typical causes for low product
development project performances were organized into a root-cause analysis diagram.
Three case studies in product development companies were performed. The tools were tested and improved
through intensive interviews with both project managers and engineers. VSM was effective for identifying
and measuring waste indicators. The root-cause analysis diagram was effective for quickly identifying root
causes for low product development project performances. Synchronized uses of these tools made it possible
to measure each root cause's impact on project performances. The result of measurements revealed both
problems shared by all the projects and the ones specific to the projects, indicating that the tools and processes
developed in this research can provide suggestions for continuous improvement of product development
processes.
Some waste indicators were more prevalent than the others, implying that the number of waste indicators to
be considered can be reduced. Inventory of information was prevalent in all the projects, and the analyses of it
implied that Today's product development processes are as premature as those of manufacturing several
decades ago. Wastefulness of information inventory was proved quantitatively. Time spent on one occurrence
of rework was proved to take longer near the end of a project than at the beginning of it.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1.1 MOTIVATION
Although different types of waste in product development have been suggested, there have
been no research investigations in determining what types of waste are more prevalent than
others in terms of wasted engineering time. Although there have been substantial amount of
literature on how to successfully manage product development projects, there is no
practical tool with which project managers can quantitatively analyze their unsuccessful
projects. For these reasons, there is no effective project management tool that enables
product development project managers to know how much each factor quantitatively affects
their product development project performances. For example, they may attribute their
product failure to late specifications/ requirements changes, but they cannot estimate how
much those changes affected the overall project performances. Therefore, it is difficult for
them to know what the right thing is to improve their product development processes.
1.2 GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The goal of this research is to develop a process for continuous creation of lean value in
product development organizations. Creation of lean value here means realizing value with
minimum wasteful process.
To achieve this goal, the objective of this research was determined to develop ideas and
methodologies of lean product development into tools and processes that can help product
development organizations (1) identify and measure the waste in their teams' processes; (2)
identify causes and measure their impacts on PD processes; and (3) finally learn the best
strategies to pursue to improve their PD processes.
1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE REMAINING CHAPTERS
Different types of waste were reexamined and nine plus one waste indicators were selected.
Value stream mapping was optimized for quantitative measurement of wasted time.
Exploration of causal relationships among these waste indicators and various types of
causes for waste lead to a comprehensive diagram that can be used for identifying root
causes for waste. To test the supposition that these can be applicable for quantitative
analysis of product developments projects, three case studies were performed.
17
Chapter 2 takes a look at lean manufacturing, and how it has been developed into lean
product development.
Three preliminary case studies were performed in chapter three, in which value stream
mapping's applicability for quantitative measurements of wastes suggested in literature on
lean product development was evaluated. Several problems were identified. These
problems were addressed in chapter 4.
Different types of waste that have been suggested in studies in lean product development
are compared in chapter 5 by exploring causal relationships among each waste. This study
was finally developed into the root-cause analysis diagram by adding more types of waste
identified in papers and books, and the preliminary case studies.
Chapter 6 is a how-to manual for drawing value stream maps for quantitative measurement
of waste. Many features of value stream mapping that were unnecessary for the purpose
were eliminated.
A methodology for measuring waste using nine waste indicators is described in chapter 7.
Inventory of information can be measured by the methodology described in chapter 8.
These methodologies were applied in the case studies covered in the following three
chapters.
Chapter 9 introduces the case studies in three industrial product development projects.
Chapter 10 discusses the quantitative analysis results obtained using nine waste indicators.
Three waste indicators detected significantly more waste than the other six. The results also
revealed rework takes more time at the end of projects than at the beginning of them.
Chapter 11 discusses results obtained by identifying inventory of information. In a project
in which market and technical risks are high, inventory of information became bad at the
rate of six percent per month. The analysis of the results described in chapters 10 and 11
suggests that the tools and methodologies developed in this research can show how
engineers' time is wasted in each specific project, implying these can be used for improving
each project's processes.
18
Chapter 12 concludes this research.
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1.4 NOTE
This thesis contains some figures in color, although the author tried to convey all the
information in black and white whenever possible. The full-color version is available online
at Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI)'s website: lean.mit.edu.
20
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The concept of "lean" was first applied to product development by introducing ideas and
tools of lean manufacturing. Wormack and Jones (1996) defined five lean principles,
"specifying value," "identify the value stream," "flow," "pull," and "striving for
perfection." Two research topics, definition of waste and practical way of value stream
mapping have been focused on by many scholars and product development practitioners,
based on the idea that addressing these topics lead to realization of the five lean principles.
From the perspective of waste, Wormack and Jones introduced nine categories of waste by
adding two new categories to Toyota's seven categories of waste in manufacturing. Slack
(1999) tried to prioritize the nine types of waste by conducting surveys of product
development organizations, questioning each category's frequencies. He also analyzed each
category's effect on value.
The definition of categories of waste has continuously been discussed by exploring the
differences between manufacturing and product development environment. Morgan (2002)
dramatically changed the definition of waste from the perspective of systems engineering.
Based on the idea that unsynchronization leads to low performance in product development
processes, he introduced eleven categories of waste, replacing all but one: waiting.
Recognizing interdependency among the categories of waste defined by forerunners, Bauch
(2004) re-defined ten categories of waste by analyzing interactions among the categories.
Value stream mapping has also been tried to apply to product development processes as
product development value stream mapping (PDVSM). Early versions of PDVSM,
inherited many features in value stream mapping for manufacturing, were not capable of
displaying activities specific to the product development environment such as iteration and
multiple tasking. Morgan (2002) improved PDVSM by making each process box' length
proportional to the time spent on it. Although this suggestion clearly differentiated PDVSM
from ordinal process maps in that unsynchronization became visible, how to display
iteration and multiple tasking remained to be solved.
21
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Figure 2.1 Ten Categories of Waste in Product Development (Bauch, 2004)
The definitions of waste have not been explicitly utilized for displaying waste in value
stream maps until Graebsch (2005) applied Bauch's definition to his microscopic case
studies of ongoing MIT student projects. He successfully measured occurrences of waste by
displaying it in value stream maps, making it possible to measure a frequency of each
category of waste on a value stream map. This achievement raised the following research
research questions:
1. Can value stream mapping be used for measuring wasted time?
2. Can value stream mapping be applied to analyses of industrial product development
processes?
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CHAPTER 3 PRELIMINARY STUDIES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
To evaluate value stream mapping's applicability for measuring wasted time, three
preliminary case studies had been performed.
3.2 THE FIRST PRELIMINARY CASE STUDY
3.2.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE FIRST CASE STUDY
The objective of this case study was to evaluate value stream mapping's applicability to
measuring wastes defined by McManus (2004) and Morgan (2002).
3.2.2 SELECTED PROJECT AND FOCUS
The first project chosen for this evaluation was a railway vehicle constructor's development
process. The railway vehicle had been developed by three design teams: body,
power/electronics, and bogie teams. For simplicity, only a mechanical designer's design
process had been tracked, based on value stream mapping techniques proposed by Morgan
and McManus. The designer's task was to re-design the structure of the current model of
railway vehicle by performing finite element analysis. The structure change had affected
the other teams design, causing cross-team iteration. The project was finished in 2002.
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Figure 3.1 Value Stream Map for One Designer's Activities with Waste Defined by
McManus (2004) and Morgan (2002) -Continued to Figure 3.2
3.2.3 DRAWING A VALUE STREAM MAP
Value stream maps created in the first preliminary case study are shown in figures 3.1 and
3.2. In this case study, process boxes' lengths were not made proportional to the time spent
on them because the remaining data of the development process did not have detailed
information about time spent on each task. Based on the designer's memory, which was the
only available resource, roughly estimated waste time was put on the value stream map.
This map was created through the following steps.
Step. 1. Draw all process boxes and add information flows.
Step. 2. Identify wastes in the lists of Morgan's and McManus'.
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Step. 3. Estimate roughly wasted time spent on each waste.
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Figure 3.2 Value Stream Map for One Engineer's Activities with Waste Defined by
McManus (2004) and Morgan (2002) -Continued from Figure 3.1
3.2.4 EVALUATION
In this case study, rework was shown by using an arrow that went back to the reworked task.
For example, in figures 3.1 and 3.2, tasks between (2) and (20) were repeated several times.
This way of showing rework made it impossible to satisfy the following rules suggested by
Morgan.
1. Process boxes' lengths should be proportional to the time spent on them.
2. Process boxes' order should be the same as their actual occurrences.
This problem is obvious when some downstream tasks are affected by an occurrence of
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rework like in figure 3.3. In this figure, task 3, which was started after task 2's start, appears
before task 2, which does not satisfy the second rule above. Thus, using going-back arrows
makes it impossible to follow Morgan's two rules.
Another problem is that using a going-back arrow makes it impossible to display how a
project's schedule is affected by an occurrence of a wasteful activity, such as making
defective information. For example, it is not obvious in figure 3.3 whether task 2 was
reworked because of defective information received from task 1, or it was reworked
because of defective information made inside of task 2. Thus, using a going-back arrow
makes it unclear how other tasks are affected by a wasteful activity. For the same reason,
measuring waste is also difficult when a going-back arrow is used.
Week 1
Time spent on
the original work
Task 1
80(4)
Total time spent on
(original work +rewor
Week 2 Week 3i I -- b
Task 3
20
'p -
task 1
)
Task 5
->40 ~
Task 2
1 40 (20) r
Going-back arrow
Figure 3.3 Simplified Value Stream Map with Rework with Going-Back Arrows
3.3 THE SECOND PRELIMINARY CASE STUDY
3.3.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE SECOND CASE STUDY
The objective of this case study was to evaluate value stream mapping's applicability to a
whole product development project.
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Week 4
Time Line
Task 5
40
Task 4
20 (10)
3.3.2 SELECTED PROJECT AND FOCUS
The same railway vehicle development project was selected for the second case study. This
time, the whole development processes were selected as the scope of the value stream map.
3.3.3 DRAWING A VALUE STREAM MAP
Figure 3.4 shows the value stream map drawn in this preliminary case study. Contrary to
the first case study, process boxes' lengths were made proportional to the time spent on
them, although the accuracy was limited. After several trials, the swim-lane form was
finally chosen.
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3.3.4 EVALUATION
Adoption of swim-lane form made it possible to draw a value stream map without making
it too complicated.
VSM of Railway Vehicle Development
Customer Se qtIMi interaction with suppliers is not described in this map.
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Figure 3.4 Value Stream Map for Whole Railway Vehicle Development Project
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3.4 THE THIRD PRELIMINARY CASE STUDY
3.4.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE THIRD CASE STUDY
The objective of this case study was to test the applicability of value stream mapping to
measuring waste inside of each task.
3.4.2 SELECTED PROJECT AND FOCUS
A student product development project was chosen as the target of the third case study. The
project was a one-semester-long project in which undergraduate students developed a
unique product, observing a strictly enforced schedule with several milestones set by
faculty. The team consisted of eighteen students. They were divided into two sub teams
during the concept development phase, each of them developing different mock-ups. After
the "mock-up review" milestone, the more promising one was selected and the sub teams
were combined into a big team.
3.4.3 DRAWING A VALUE STREAM MAP
Because the objective of this case study was to measure waste only within process boxes,
information flows were not drawn in the value stream map. Instead, both planned and
actual processes were drawn to make schedule slips visible. As a result, the value stream
map (figures 3.5 and 3.6) became similar to a Gantt chart. The tracked period included four
milestone reviews including the mock-up review. Each task had two boxes in the value
stream map: the upper one being the original schedule and the lower one being the actual
process. Rework processes were distinguished by being hatched. In this case study, process
boxes' lengths were precisely made proportional to the period between the start and end
dates. Instead of using wastes defined by McManus and Morgan, nine waste indicators
introduced in chapter 5 were used.
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Figure 3.5 Value Stream Map for a MIT Student Product Development Project -
Continued to Figure 3.6.
3.4.4 EVALUATION
In this case study, all rework took more time than the original work. One reason for this
phenomenon was that scope of the tasks extended as students identified several problems
through manufacturing process of a mock-up. However, there was another reason: the
students did not work as intensively as they had done in the original work: the tasks had not
been worked on all the time. This situation corresponds to today's prevalent product
development environment in which the same engineers are shared by some projects. And,
generally, the sizes of impacts from outside of the project fluctuate. Possible problems
caused by impacts from outside of the project are the following:
1. Project delays due to low availability of engineers.
2. Information loses its value even while it is not worked on because of risks including
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market risk (see chapter 8).
Therefore, even when a value stream map's focus is one project, impacts from outside of
the focused project should be displayed explicitly somehow.
10/20 10/21
SMockup
10/27
LaFinal
Donaabctn
I III
Product Cotwract(MkwtlCutomrwrArvoyads)
R DEIIu MO4IIiS mid InWtf
11/3
Lab
1118 11/10 11/12
Assey Mdl Lab InCla
Revipw
Watn gfor
itusev
Detie Des n ai
Wol
be C
k Percei
omplek
us
/ed to
Prep lass
Figure 3.6 Value Stream Map for a MIT Student Product Development Project -
Continued from Figure 3.5.
31
10/13 11/17
Lab
'AX1PW ---------
aft OW77 procankv. 17 "
inmtpoon on samytreguh4ons
Product GOOMetry Deftet
CHAPTER 4 IMPROVEMENT SUGGESTIONS FOR VALUE
STREAM MAPPING
4.1 WAY OF DISPLAYING REWORK
The problem about representation of rework (3.2.4) can be addressed by displaying rework
with a separate box (figure 4.1). This makes it possible to satisfy the two rules suggested by
Morgan (2002) (see 3.2.4). In order to make it easy to identify the original task of the
rework, only the process boxes for rework should be along the same line with that of the
original task.
Only the same tasks should be
along the same line.
Figure 4.1 Showing Rework in a Separate Process Box
4.2 ADOPTION OF SWIM-LANE FORM
Generally, hand-offs across functional groups take more time and effort than they do within
a functional group. In the second preliminary case study, swim-lane value stream mapping
could successfully visualize this difference. Adoption of this swim-lane form was also
effective for keeping the value stream map organized in spite of high complexity of
communications across many functional groups. Additionally, when used in combination
with the method suggested in 4.5, Swim-lane value stream mapping made it possible to
visualize how unsynchronization happened due to interrupting events.
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4.3 SHOWING BOTH PLANNED AND ACTUAL SCHEDLULES
In the third preliminary case study, interviews with students were performed several times.
When students were asked if they had found any wasteful activity in their development
process with the value stream map displaying only actual processes, it was difficult to get
enough information related to waste. After adding the original schedule information to the
value stream map, however, it became significantly easier. Thus, showing both planned and
actual schedules turned out effective for identifying wasteful activities through interviews.
4.4 DISPLAYING INTERRUPTING EVENTS
As indicated in the third preliminary case study, engineers are sometimes occupied with
tasks from outside of the project, causing project delay. Such interruption is one of major
sources of project delay as well as waste inside of the project: in order to accurately
measure waste derived from activities inside of a project, it is necessary to know whether
delay is caused by activities inside of the project or not. Interrupting event can explicitly be
shown by using a sign shown in figure 4.2.
An Ean Ited Task
out of the Project
Figure 4.2 Way of Showing an Interrupting Event
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CHAPTER 5 ROOT-CAUSE ANALYSIS DIAGRAM
5.1 ANALYSIS OF RELATIONSHIP AMONG DIFFERENT TYPES OF WASTE
Table 5.1 compares several definitions by forerunners. Toyota's seven categories of waste
have been revised to address waste in product development processes. Wormack and Jones
(1996) modified Toyota's definition by adding two categories, "complexity," and "time
lag," and removing over processing. Although these two added categories are not in
Toyota's definition, they are the ones that are not peculiar to product development
processes. In addition, "time lag" is related to over processing in that time lag causes over
processing - time lag means rework discovery time, and long rework discovery time causes
over processing (on defects). Morgan dramatically revised the definition by replacing all
but "waiting.", based on the systems perspective. Bauch (2004) revised these definitions by
analyzing interactions among each category of waste. The total number of all the categories
referred to above sums up to twenty three.
5.2 DEVELOPMENT OF ROOT-CAUSE ANALYSIS DIAGRAM WITH NINE PLUS
ONE WASTE INDICATORS
Because one of this research's objectives were making it possible to measure waste in
product development processes, using all the categories, which were twenty three in total,
in Table 5.1 was unrealistic. To deduce a frugal set of categories of waste, the causal
relationships among the categories in table 5.1 were analyzed. Figure 5.1 shows an example
of this analysis, in which the definitions by Morgan (2002) and McManus (2004) were
compared. This figure reveals that most of Morgan's categories were causes for the waste
categories defined by McManus, which basically inherited Toyota's seven categories of
waste. For example, "lack of system discipline (Morgan)" causes "over production
(McManus)," "unsynchronized concurrent tasks (Morgan)," and "ineffective
communication (Morgan)." This analysis had been expanded by incorporating other waste
definitions and various factors of low performances in product development processes
found in papers and books. And, it had been improved through the preliminary case studies
discussed in chapter 3. The complete result of this analysis is shown in 5.4: Root-Cause
Analysis Diagram.
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Table 5.1 Com parison of the Definitions of Waste
Toyota's seven Wormack and
wastes (Ohno, Jones(1996) Morgan (2002) McManus (2004) Bauch (2004)
1978)
1 Waiting Wait Time Waiting Waiting Waiting
2 Transportation Transport - Transportation Transport/ Handoffs
Excessive
3 Over Processing -- Pcessivg Over Processing
Processing __________
4 Inventory Inventory - Inventory Inventory
5 Defects Defects - Defects Defects
6 Motion Movement -Unnecessary MovementMotion
Overproduction/
7 Over Production Overproduction - Over Production Unsynchronized
Processes
8 - Complexity -_-_-
9 - Time Lag -_-_-
10 - Hand-Offs - Transport/ Handoffs
11 -External Quality
Enforcement
12 - - Transaction -
13 - - Re-invention - Re-Invention
14 - - Lack of System Lack of System
Discipline Discipline
15 - - High Process andArrival Variation
16 - - System OverUtilization
17 - - Expediting - -
18 - - Large Batch Sizes - -
19 - - Redundant Tasks - -
20 - - Stop-and-Go Tasks - -
21 - - UnsynchronizedConcurrent Tasks
Ineffective
22 ---- Communication
23 - - - Limited IT Resources
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Au HighProcessand EffecArrival Variation
(Morgan-W7)
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MMgM an-W6a
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Unnecessary Motion]
External Quality Enforcement Transportation (McManus-WS)
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Hand-Offs
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t
Figure 5.1 Analyses of Relationships among the Categories of Waste Defined by Morgan and McManus - The
Categories without the Name of Morgan or McManus were added by the Author.
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5.3 DEFINITIONS OF NINE WASTE INDICATORS AND INVENTORY OF
INFORMATION
5.3.1 DEDUCING NINE WASTE INDICATORS FROM THE ROOT-CAUSE ANALYSIS
DIAGRAM
The root-cause analysis diagram is shown in 5.4. The rightmost categories in the diagram
are root causes, and leftmost ones, effects. From the perspective of measurement, desirable
categories of waste are the ones that can easily be identified and the wasted time measured.
It was found that effects are easier to measure than their causes. For example, wasted time
on "waiting" can be measured by measuring an engineer's waiting periods. However,
wasted time on "system over utilization" is difficult to measure; "System over utilization is
the root cause for waiting in figure 5.1. Therefore, the nine leftmost categories, which are
effects, were chosen as metrics of waste in product development processes. They are named
waste indicators because they are not causes for waste, but indicate that time is wasted for
some reasons.
NINE WASTE INDICATORS
1. OVERPRODUCTION
2. WAITING
3. TRANSPORTATION
4. OVER PROCESSING
5. MOTION
6. REWORK
7. RE-INVENTION
8. HAND-OFF
9. DEFECTIVE INFORMAITON
Rework is the one that had neither been identified by the forerunners in Table. 5.1. It was
added by the author because it has frequently been pointed out as indicator of low
performances by many scholars and product development practitioners.
As can be understood from 5.4, the entries in the nine waste indicators are not mutually
exclusive. For example, defective information causes rework (5.4.5). The reason why the
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author allowed this redundancy is the existence of strong interdependency among waste in
product development: one occurrence of waste can cause many different types of waste,
possibly forming a vicious circle, and this interdependency differs on a case-by-case basis.
Therefore, reducing one waste indicator may make the set of waste indicators an
insufficient one. Thus, the author maintained the nine (plus one described in 5.3.2) waste
indicators at this point; the waste indicators are prioritized in the case studies discussed in
chapter 10.
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Table 5.2 Definitions and Examples of Nine Waste Indicators
Waste Indicators Description Typical Examples
1. Overproduction of Different people/groups are -Duplicate creation of information due to
Information (Duplication) unintentionally creating the unclear division of labor
same information.
2. Waiting of People People are waiting. -People are forced to wait because of
delay of upstream tasks.
3. Transportation of Information is in transportation. -Paper mail, packages
Information (Preparing and -Tardy approval process with multiple
forwarding information) signatures.
4. Over Processing Engineers create information -Creating information based on defective
that won't contribute the value data.
of product. -Trying to design beyond target
specifications
5. Motion of People People have to spend time on -Manual data conversion
(Information hunting, travel, non value-adding motions. -Business trips
reviews, documentation, and
meetings)
6. Rework Redoing tasks perceived to be -Correcting/Revising designs that failed
finished for some reason to pass Reviews.
-Updating completed information due to
requirement changes
7. Re-Invention Designing similar things -Design similar thing twice because past
without utilizing past designs are not well documented.
experience.
8. Hand-Off Information is handed off with -Hand-off of information to downstream
(Hand-off inside of project) its responsibility between two designers.
groups/people.
9. Defective Information Erroneous or incomplete -Design not feasible
(Coupled to Over Processing information. -Information that does not meet the
and Rework) requirements (final, milestone, etc).
5.3.2 INVENTORY OF INFORMATION
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Inventory of information is different from the nine waste indicators in that engineers' time
is not wasted while information is inventoried. In spite of this, inventory of information was
also identified as one waste indicator in this research because inventoried information can
lose value, causing rework. Inventory of formation is discussed in detail chapter 8.
5.4 ROOT-CAUSE ANALYSIS DIAGRAM FOR NINE WASTE INDICATORS
The complete root-cause analysis diagram is shown in Appendix II
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CHAPTER 6: VALUE STREAM MAPPING FOR QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS OF PD PROJECTS
6.1 OBJECTIVE
Value stream mapping was originally developed for use in manufacturing environment, and
later its scope was expanded to product development environment as PDVSM (Product
Development Value Stream Mapping). For this historical reason, PDVSM took over various
rules for displaying different types of information flows and activities that had been
developed for detailed analyses of manufacturing processes. Some of these rules in
PDVSM are unnecessary in this research because the main purpose of using value stream
mapping is measuring wasted time. Unnecessary rules are eliminated, and, instead, some
minimum set of rules necessary for measurements are introduced in this chapter based on
the suggestions discussed in 4.2.
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6.2 VALUE STREAM MAPPING (VSM) FOR DETAILED ANALYSIS
OF PROJECTS
6.2.1 TIME LINE AND GRIDS
This value stream mapping is similar to a cross-functional process chart in that it has
process boxes and arrows that represent flows (figure 6.1). One of the major differences
from a cross-functional process chart is that the horizontal axis of the value stream map is a
time line with weekly gridlines.
- --- - - - - - - - - - - -
* I I
I I I
I I I
* I I
I II I II I I
I I II I I
I S II I I
I I I
I I I
I I I
I I I
I I
Figure 6.1 Time Line and Grids
42
6.2.2 PROCESS BOXES - ALLOCATION AND LENGTH
(1) Process Boxes for the Development of the Same Function
If development of a function can be divided into several different phases, each phase should
be assigned one process box (figure 6.2). As can be seen in this figure, downstream phase
for a function is allocated immediately below its adjacent upstream phase
Figure 6.2 Allocations of Adjacent Phases
(2) Process Boxes for Rework
Process boxes for rework should be allocated on the same line of the original tasks (figure
6.3).
Figure 6.3 Allocation of a Process Box for Rework
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This rule does not apply to the process boxes for different functions (figure 6.4). Different
tasks can be on the same line if they are not for the same function.
Development of different functions.
Figure 6.4 Allocations of Process Boxes for Different Functions
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(3) Beginnings and Ends of Process Boxes
Beginnings and the ends of the process boxes should be consistent with the time line at the
top of the map (Morgan, 2002). As a result, process boxes' lengths become proportional to
the time spent on them.
Week 1 Week 2
Phase 1 was started on the
first day week 1, and had
been worked on for three
days without any interruption
lasting more than one day
Figure 6.5 Beginnings and Ends Process Boxes- Beginnings and Ends of the Process
Boxes Should Match the Time Line at the Top of the Value Stream Map
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6.2.3 BOXES - COLOR CODES
(1) Displaying Actual Processes (figure 6.6)
Process boxes for actual processes are painted in blue as long as their length do not exceed
the scheduled periods. On the other hand, in cases in which tasks took longer than
scheduled, the excess time should be shown by painting in pink.
Tasks within scheduled time
Tasks over scheduled time
Surplus of scheduled time
Finished earlier than the Took more time than
day) original schedule by one the original schedule by
day one day
Figure 6.6 Blue, White, and Pink Boxes
(2) Displaying Original Schedules
There are two ways to show original schedules. One way is allocating white boxes that
show original schedules (figure 6.7). This method is effective for clearly visualizing
schedule slippage from original plans. In this research, this method was applied to the case
study in the project B (see chapter 9). However, in cases in which schedule slippage is
significant, or processes are interrupted frequently, this method makes value stream maps
too complicated.
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Another usage of white boxes is using them only when tasks are finished earlier than
scheduled; in figure 6.6, a white box is used for showing that phase 1 was finished earlier
before its due date by one day. This method is applied to case studies in projects A and C
(see chapter 9).
T w-- - - - s ---d ---d-t m -
Tasks within scheduled time
Tasks overscheduled time
Liii Original plan
------------------------------
Func. A P1 (1day)
Finished earlier than the
original schedule by one
day
Took more time than
the original schedule by
one day
Func. A P2 (6 days) I
Figure 6.7 Using White Boxes for Showing Original Schedule
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(3) Displaying Review and Testing Processes
Review and testing processes should be shown by using diamonds (figure 6.8).
Review
---------------
Figure 6.8 Displaying Review and Testing Processes
(4) Displaying Rework
Rework should be painted in orange (figure 6.9).
Figure 6.9 Displaying Rework
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Review
Original Work
Rework
(5) Displaying Over Processing
Usually over processing is submerged in value adding activities, but when the whole output
of a process is considered over processing, its process box should be painted in yellow
(figure 6.10)
Original Work
Rework
Over Processing
The whole work was
abandoned
Function A Review
Phase 2
Original Work
(Over Processing)
Figure 6.10 Displaying Over Processing
6.2.4 ARROWS - COLOR CODES
(1) Information flow inside the same swim lane
Timeliness of information transfer is one measure of information quality defined by Bauch
(2004). Information flows inside the same swim lane should be shown with gray lines if the
transferred information is used in a timely manner (typically within a day: this criterion is
contingent with various factors such as the project's scheduled period and the market's
mobility). If the information is kept untouched for a specific period such as one day or
more, the information transfer is considered as inventory, and it should be shown with
green lines (figure 6.11).
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Timely Transfer (used in a day)
Delayed Information Transfer
(Inventory of Information)
One Day or More
Within
Day
Figure 6.11 Timely Information Transfer and Delayed Information Transfer -
Information Stored for a Specific Period is Distinguished by Using Green Lines
This rule is also applicable for the information stored because the group or the engineer is
interrupted in the middle of a task (figure. 6.12).
t Delayed Information Transfer
(Inventory of Information)
-- - ----------------------------
Figure 6.12 Displaying an Interruption
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One
One Day or More
I
(2) Information transfer with Hand-Off (Information Flow across Swim Lanes)
Hand-Offs (information transfer among engineers/ groups) are marked in blue if the
information is handed off immediately (figure 6.13). Typically, transferred information used
in one day satisfies this condition. However, this criterion is contingent on various factors
including as the market's mobility and the scheduled development period. Hand-Off in
which information is kept untouched for one day or more is wasteful and is covered by two
waste indicators, hand-off and information inventory. Hand offs with inventory periods
should be distinguished from the other hand-offs by using red lines (figure 6.13).
- Timely Hand-Off
a Delayed Hand-Off
Hand-off with Inventory)
One day or more
In one day
Figure 6.13 Different Types of Hand-Offs
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6.2.5 INTERACTIONS
Bi-directional information exchanges are shown by using bi-directional arrows (figure
6.14)
Figure 6.14 Displaying Bi-directional Information Exchanges
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6.2.6 CROSS-FUNCTIONAL TASKS
Cross-functional tasks should be shown in the way described in figure 6.15.
Figure 6.15 Displaying Cross-Functional Tasks
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6.2.7 INTERRUPTIONS
In most organizations, engineers are required to work on multiple tasks. Many scholars and
product development practitioners have pointed out that this multiple tasking significantly
affects product development projects. In this value stream mapping, all tasks that are not
part of the focused project are treated as interruptions, and shown as in figure 6.16.
Timely Transfer (used in a day)
o Delayed Information Transfer
(Inventory of Information)
Interruption
An ExpeditW Task
0* f h Projet
Figure 6.16 Displaying Interruptions
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6.2.8 TIME RECORDING
Time spent on every task should be put on a value stream map (figure 6.17). The total time
of weekly hours of labor of each functional group should also be put on a value stream map.
These numbers will be used for measuring wasted time (chapters 7 and 8).
Numbers in Blue: Time Spent on Each Task'
Numbers in Orange: Time Spent on thb
Focused Project
--- - - - - - - - -
- -- - - - - - -
- - - - - I -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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1242
40 40
I 40
-- - - - - -
- -- - - - -
- - -- - - -
- - - - -- - -
- - - - -- -
- - - - - -- 
- - - - - - -
Figure 6.17 Displaying Spent Time
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6.2.9 WASTE INDICATORS
Measured wasted time should be put on value stream maps in the way described in figure
6.18.
| Inventory of Information
Assigned ID (i stands for inventory)
Inventory period
1001-5days
One of nine waste indicators
Wasted time Re-Invention
3h)w-001
Assigned ID
(w stands for waste indicator)
Figure 6.18 Displaying Wasted Time
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CHAPTER 7: HOW TO MEASURE WASTED TIME IDENTIFIED BY
NINE WASTE INIDICATORS USING VALUE STREAM MAPPING
7.1 INTRODUCTION OF THIS CHAPTER
This chapter describes ways for measuring wasted time that is detected by nine waste
indicators defined in 5.3. All the wasted time on waste indicators are measured in units of
engineering time.
7.2 OVERPRODUCTION
When overproduction occurred, engineering time spent on overproduction is regarded as
time wasted on overproduction (figure 7.1).
Wasted time is this period
* . * a * . . . m o
Creating the sam
Non
Value-Adding
Work
Wasted Engineering Time
t o a - a r a a a a
information
Figure 7.1 Measuring Time Spent on Overproduction - A Hatched Process Box Mean
Overproduction
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7.3 WAITING
When an engineer was forced to wait doing nothing, the period for which the engineer had
waited is regarded as time wasted on waiting (figure 7.2). Waiting is rare in today's product
development environment, for engineers usually have several tasks in their cues.
Wasted time is this period
- 0 - a -a -0 -N -
:1//////////////////////- U
Wasted Engineering Time (A
engineer is just waiting doing
nothing)
Figure 7.2 Measuring Time Spent on Waiting
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7.4 TRANSPORTATION OF INFORAMTION
Sometimes transportation of information takes up a substantial amount of engineers' time.
Figure 7.3 is an example case in which an engineer needs to provide his/ her CAD data to a
supplier. He/ she may need to spend his/ her time on data conversion processes, which is
usually not completely automatic. In this case, time the engineer spent on data conversion is
wasted time on transportation.
Example: re-formatting of data Non Value-Adding
Work (re-formatting)
Wasted Engineeri g
Time
Wasted time is this period
To a supplier, an outsourced
company, etc.
Figure 7.3 Measuring Time Spent on Transportation
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7.5 OVER PROCESSING
Wasted time on over processing can be measured in the way shown in figure 7.4.
Determination of the actual time spent on over processing usually requires intensive
interviews with engineers, for over processing occurs concurrently with other value adding
work.
Non Value-Adding
Work (discarded)
Wasted Engineering
Time
Wasted time is this period
Figure 7.4 Measuring Time Spent on Over Processing
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7.6 MOTION
Figure 7.5 is an example of motion. In this example, engineer spent some time on
reviewing another engineer's work. Time spent on reviewing is considered to be wasted
time.
Vasted Engineer's
Wasted time is this period
Non Value-Addin
ime
Figure 7.5 Measuring Time Spent on Motion
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7.7 REWORK
Figure 7.6 is an example of measuring wasted time on rework. In this example, the original
work was partially reworked. In such a case, wasted time on rework should be the total time
of A and B (figure 7.6). A is time spent on discarded work, and B, time spent on
troubleshooting. C is considered to be value adding activity. A is sometimes difficult to
measure, but C can substitute for A when measuring wasted time. Examples of
measurements of rework is shown in figure 10.20.
Original
Wasted
Time
Discarded Portion Non Value-Adding
Work (discarded)
(C)
(A) (B) J
Engineers'
Measured period
Figure 7.6 Measuring Time Spent on Rework
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7.8 RE-INVENTION
Figure 7.7 is an example in which two engineers invented the same information. In this
case, time spent on the second invention is regarded as the time wasted on re-invention.
Work that could have eliminated by
recycling the output by another
Communication that
occurred
engineer
should have
U U
U
U
*
U
U
U
U
m U U U - - - U - m - - U - N - E U - U
U
U
U
U
U
U
mummumum
Wasted time is this period
Figure 7.7 Measuring Time Spent on Re-Invention
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7.9 HAND-OFF
Sometimes hand-offs takes both the sender's and the receiver's time: the sender may need
to spend his/her time on documentation that could be avoided without hand-off, and the
receiver usually needs to spend his/her time on understanding the sender's work. Figure 7.8
is an example in which both engineers wasted time on hand-off.
Non Value-Adding Work (documentation)
* UU U U U a a UMWasted Engineers' Time
Wasted time is these periods
Figure 7.8 Measuring Time Spent on Hand-Off
64
7.10 DEFECTIVE INFORMATION
Defective information causes waste of time in various forms including rework, time spent
on reviews and testing, and customer support work after launching the product. Figure 7.9
is an example in which defective information caused rework. In this case, wasted time is
the time spent on creating defective information and fixing it. In many cases, time spent on
creating defective information cannot be easily distinguished from other vale-adding
activities. In such cases, measuring time on fixing defective information is sufficient.
Original work Discarded Portion
Occurrence
Defective Inf
of
ormation
Time Wasted, but
Cannot be Easily
Measured
Discarded Portion
Measured Period
Figure 7.9 Measuring Time Spent on Defective Information
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CHAPTER 8: INVENTORY OF INFORMATION AND HOW TO
MEASURE IT USING VALUE STREAM MAPPING
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Goldratt (1997) insists in his book "Critical Chain" on not allocating buffer times except at
the ends of projects. McManus (2004) puts stress on wastefulness of inventory of
information in his "PDVSM Manual," arguing "work in progress" information may become
obsolete while it is stored. Both arguments share the common idea that created information
should not be kept waiting. However, alike in manufacturing environment, inventory
cannot be completely eliminated for two reasons. One is that product development teams
usually do not have enough numbers of engineers to keep all information busy all the time.
The other is the risks and uncertainties existing in product development projects. This is
why even the scheduling methodology suggested by Goldratt requires buffer time allocated
on feeding paths.
Thus, there exist two tradeoffs related to inventory of information. One exists between cost
of having a big team and cost of having obsolete information caused by having a small
team. The other exists between the risk of depleting buffer time, and, again, the risk of
having obsolete information. Depletion of buffer time unsynchoronizes the whole project
schedule, causing subsequent waste.
Because of these trade-offs, there can be no universal solution for determining the right
number of engineers and the right buffer times: product development organizations need to
know how much inventory of information costs in their specific contexts. Without
quantitative data, they cannot optimize buffer allocations in their schedules. For instance, in
an environment in which market is significantly unstable, a huge team that realizes short
development cycle times may be desirable because information created goes bad quickly.
This research tries to shed light on this topic: the deterioration of information inventory and
how to measure it. 8.2 discusses how information goes bad. "Interest rate" of inventory of
information is calculated in the case study of Project A; the result is discussed in chapter 11.
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8.2 DEFINITIONS OF ROTTEN INFORMATION AND FRESH INFORMATION
Rotten inventory in this thesis is the information inventory that needs to be reworked
partially or completely due to changes occurred inside or out of the project. For example,
information inventory may need to be reworked because a significant market change is
identified. More discussions on causes of rotten information are covered in 8.3.
8.3 HOW INFORMATION GETS ROTTEN
8.3.1 MARKET CHANGE
In some markets, customers' preferences change so quickly that products can be obsolete in
one year. This means that the specifications set at the beginning of projects may become
obsolete before finishing the projects. Even when customers' preference is consistent, a
product loses its value when a competitor releases a product with similar features because
most of the leading customers are unlikely to buy the second product.
8.3.2 REQUIREMENTS CHANGE
Shifting requirements are also causes for rotten information. Work-in-progress information
may become obsolete by changes in requirements: a fighter's specification is unlikely to be
consistent for ten years. Requirements changes may also be caused by internal events such
as boss change.
8.3.3 TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES
Shenhar et al. (2003) argues that overlapping among tasks should be less when technical
risk/ uncertainty levels are relatively high. This implies that concurrent engineering's
applicability is contingent on the risk/ uncertainty levels. In concurrent engineering,
downstream tasks are sometimes started with tentative information from upstream tasks.
Working on tentative information may cause rework because the tentative information may
turn out to be defective for various reasons like technical difficulties. In such a case, some
portion of the original work becomes rotten, causing rework (figure 8.1).
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Upstream Work
Tentative
T- i Replac ment
output
Original rk
Rotten Portion
(Engineers' -
time wasted)
Final output (inconsistent with the
pre-released information because
of technical problems)
Rework
Figure 8.1 Rotten Information Due to Technical Risk
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CHAPTER 9: OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH INVESTIGATIONS
9.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The lean tools and processes are developed through readings and preliminary case studies.
However, it was still uncertain that the tools and processes are applicable for measurements
in industrial product development projects. Specifically, the following questions were
raised.
(1) NINE WASTE INDICATORS
" Are they sufficient to address all the waste in product development processes?
" Are all the waste indicators equally prevalent, or some are more important than
the others?
(2) INVENTORY OF INFORMATION
" To what extent inventory of information is prevalent in industrial product
development processes?
" How quickly inventoried information gets rotten?
" How much labor does it take to refresh rotten information?
(3) THE VALUE STREAM MAPPING FOR QUANTITATIVE MEASUREMENT
* Can the value stream mapping be applicable for measuring wasted time on every
waste indicator defined in this research?
(4) THE ROOT-CAUSE ANALYSIS DIAGRAM
* Does the root-cause analysis diagram contain all the causes for wasteful product
development processes?
(5) OVERALL
* Can the lean tools and processes described above deliver to product development
organizations information that leads to continuous improvement of their
value-creating processes?
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To answer these questions, the next step is determined to test the tools and processes in
several product development projects.
9.2 ABOUT THE COMPANIES AND PROJECTS
9.2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE THREE PROJECTS
Table 9.1 briefly introduces the three projects investigated in this research. The product
being developed in Project B is the replacement of the one developed in Project A.
Table 9.1 Description of the Three Investigated Projects
Project A Project B Project C
Company Company X (Hdqrs: USA) Company Y(Hdqrs: Japan)
Investigated Japan
Development Site
5 Engineers +Focused Team 6 Engineers + Managers Mngers
Managers
Team's Deliverable Embedded Software for a High-Tech Machine
Total Number of
Involved Engineers 100+
(Partially or Fully)
Status at the Time of
Investigation Finished Ongoing Ongoing
Investigated Period 50 Weeks 17 Weeks 30 Weeks
Investigation
Invetigaion (After Setting Basic
Investigated Detailed Design Phase
Phase(s) Phase (After Setting Basic Specifications) +
Detailed Design
Specifications)Phase
Needs: Unstable Needs: Stable
Market Size: Unstable Market Size:
Unstable
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9.2.2 DIFFICULTIES IN THE PROJECTS
Although the three projects are similar in that they are all embedded software development
projects, they all had their own difficulties.
Project A
Design Issues
* Major architecture design change caused by their decision to integrate several
components of the existing model to a single component.
" Higher complexity incurred due to this integration.
" In spite of more constraints caused by the integrated design, higher performance was
required due to technological development in the market at the time of the beginning of
the project.
Project Management Issues
" Offshore outsourcing.
" Resource contention: most engineers are shared by some other projects, causing
multiple-tasking. In addition, the interruptions by them were not always predictable,
leading to unsynchronization of processes.
Project B
Design Issue
0 Maintain compatibility with the previous model.
Project Management Issue
0 Scheduled to be completed in half the time spent on Project A.
Project C
Design Issue
* Realize high compatibility with the other manufacturer's machine.
" Basically no communication channel with users - their needs are communicated via the
customer.
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9.3 INVESTIGATION SCHEDULE
9.3.1 OVERVIEW OF INVESTIGATION SCHEDULE
Companies X and Y were visited three times and twice respectively. Phone calls and emails
had been exchanged between and after the visits. Company X's investigation lasted for
three months, and Company Y's, two months. Detailed schedule for the investigation of
Company X is described in the following sections. The investigation of Company y
followed similar processes, although I could make it more efficient by applying what I had
learned through the investigation of Company X.
9.3.2 DETAILED SCHEDULE FOR COMPANY X
Preparation
A telephone conference was held with two project managers and one engineer; all of them
were active members of projects A and B. Basic information about both projects (project
periods, the team's roles, number of involved engineers) were informed, and the scope of
the investigation was discussed. Both parties agreed to start the investigation at the end of
the conference.
The First Visit
Activities
The first visit to company A lasted five days. On the first day, basic information about the
two projects (including organizational structure and its changes, detailed processes, the
products, and the market) was explained by the project managers and an engineer. The
second and third days were spent on drawing the first version of Project A's value stream
map. Last two days were spared for interviews with one of the project managers and all the
available engineers engaged in Project(s) A and/or B. Each interview took 30 to 60 minutes.
Common interview questions included the following:
* "What do you think was the difference between the two projects?" "Why do you think
so?"
* "What kind of difficulties had you encountered through Project A?
These questions worked as effective catalysts.
Although most meetings were held in the company's conference rooms, I was allowed to
occupy a desk located close to the development team. This helped me to develop a better
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understanding about how they work, how information is exchanged, and even each
engineer's personality.
Obtained Data Other than from Interviews
Project A:
* MS-Project files with the scheduled and actual processes.
* Each engineer's weekly reports sent to the project managers. The report includes
information about time spent on each task, updated information about the problems and
difficulties the engineers encountered, and their updated plans for the month.
Project B:
* The MS-Project file that included both the scheduled and actual processes.
What I learned
Value stream maps for the finished portions of projects should be completed if possible, for
drawing them takes long time. In order to do to do this, both actual and planned schedules
should be obtained well before a visit. For this reason, before I visit Company Y, I obtained
as much information as possible, leading to more effective and efficient information
exchanges then.
Between the First and the Second Visits
Weekly Updates from the Project Manager
Project B's weekly reports were sent from the project manager to me through the internet
every week. The reports were basically intended to report to the other project managers,
and they contained information obtained through peer-to-peer interviews with each
engineer, the actual time spent on Project B. Updated MS-Project files were attached to the
reports. Telephone conferences with the project manager were held for thirty minutes on
average almost every week; most of the time was spent on asking questions about the
recent weekly reports.
Other Information Exchanges
Additional information was obtained by exchanging emails and phone calls with engineers.
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Drawing Value Stream Maps
Project A's value stream map was made based on the schedule information in the
MS-Project file. Project B's value stream map was updated after each telephone conference.
The Second Visit
Intensive interviews with the project manager and all the available engineers were
performed through this two-day visit. Tentative versions of the value stream maps were
used for asking questions. Project A's value stream map at that time had information about
schedule slips, and interviews were focused on repeatedly asking the reasons for the slips
until root causes were identified as is suggested by Ohno (1978). Project B's value stream
map, having more detailed information than Project A's by then, was used for asking
reasons for identified wastes and information flows that had not been identified in the value
stream map.
Between the Second and the third Visits
Almost same activities and information exchanges were performed as the first interval.
Several reports on Project A's design/code reviews were obtained. Project A's value stream
map was improved reflecting the recent interview results and the information in each
engineer's weekly reports.
The Third Visit
With more detailed value stream maps, intensive interviews with engineers were performed.
A presentation showing tentative results was held in front of two project managers and
several engineers, followed by extensive discussions.
After The Third Visit
Value stream maps were updated by reflecting the recent interview results. Root-cause
analyses using the root-cause analysis diagram were performed based on all the information
obtained by then and additional emails and phone calls. Wasted time on each identified
waste was measured using the methodology explained in chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 10: RESULTS OF RESEARCH INVESTIGATIONS 1:
ANALYSES ON NINE WASTE INDICATORS
10.1 OVERVIEW OF THIS CHAPTER
10.2 looks into the wasted time captured by the nine waste indicators. Some waste
indicators were more significant than the others. 10.3 analyzes the result by looking into the
causes for the wasted time with the root-cause analysis diagram. 10.4 summarizes this
chapter.
10.2. OVERALL RESULTS
10.2.1 NUMBER OF OCCURENCES
Figure 10.1 shows the occurrences of waste indicators per 50 engineering weeks in the
three projects. Motion was the most frequent in all the projects. Especially, its occurrences
were outstanding in Project C. The occurrences of over production, waiting, and rework
were fewer than the others. Project B had fewer occurrences of rework and defective
information. One of the reasons for this is that most of the tracked period of Project B was
on the investigation phase, on which some need for rework may be undiscovered, and the
rework not yet done.
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Figure 10.1 Normalized Occurrences of Waste Indicators per 50 Engineering Weeks in
Projects A, B, and C
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10.2.2 AVERAGE WASTED TIME PER ONE OCCURENCE
Figure 10.2 shows the average wasted time on each waste indicator in the three projects.
The overall average wasted time per one occurrence of waste indicator in Projects A, B, and
C were 17, 3, and 8 engineering hours respectively. Overproduction took 23 hours in
Project A on average. Waiting, along with motion and hand-off, had less average wasted
time than the others. Over processing, rework, and defective information took 17 hours or
more on average, except in Project B, which was on its investigation phase during my
survey period.
Wasted Times per Each Occurrence of a Waste Indicator
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Figure 10.2 Wasted Time per Each Occurrence of a Waste Indicator in Projects, A, B,
and C
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10.2.3 TOTAL WASTED TIME
Figure 10.3 shows the total wasted time on each waste indicator in the three projects. Over
processing, motion, rework, and defective information were the top four waste indicators in
almost all the three projects. This implies that the four waste indicators are more important
than the others. Although one occurrence of overproduction wasted 23 hours on average in
Project A, the total wasted time on it was trivial compared to the top four waste indicators.
Waiting was also trivial, implying engineers always have some tasks in their cues.
Project A's wasted time on over production was outstanding among the three projects,
indicating that 1,438 engineering hours were wasted for some reasons, including changes
and errors. Project A also wasted time on rework more than the other two projects. Project
B's wasted time was much less than the others in transportation, motion, rework, and
defective information. This result will be analyzed in detail in 10.3.
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Wasted Times per 50 Eng. Weeks and Waste Indicators
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Figure 10.3 Normalized Total Wasted Time per 50 Engineering Weeks and Waste Indicators
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10.2.4 TEMPORAL CHANGES IN WASTE INDICATOR DISTRIBUTIONS
Figures 10.4-10.6 show temporal changes in waste indicator distributions in Projects A-C
respectively. In Project A, the total wasted time fluctuated over time. This fluctuation
implies the software team's activities, which are the downstream tasks of the hardware
team's activities, had largely been affected by intermittent hardware releases, for Project A
involved major changes in both hardware and software. In contrast, Project C, which
involved no major hardware change, had much less fluctuation than Project A. Wasted time
on rework increased as time spent on the project increases in all three projects.
Temporal Changes in Waste Indicator Distribution (Project A)
o Defective Information
0 Hand-Offs
3 Re-Invention
a] Rework
o Motion
E Over processing
E3 Transportation
* Waiting
* Overproduction
6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50
Eng. Week
Figure 10.4 Temporal Changes in Waste Indicator Distribution in Project A
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Figure 10.5 Temporal Changes in Waste Indicator Distribution in Project B
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Temporal Changes in Waste Indicator Distribution (Project C)
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Figure 10.6 Temporal Changes in Waste Indicator Distribution in Project C
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10.2.5 DISTRIBUTION OF WASTE INDICATORS AMONG ENGINEERS
Figures 10.7, 10.8, and 10.9 show the distributions of waste indicators of each engineer in
the three projects. As can be understood from these figures, the distributions differ
significantly among engineers. Tables 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3 briefly introduce the engineers'
profiles. These results illustrate the following:
Waste indicator distribution is contingent on each engineer's qualification level, each
engineer's role, and how information flows.
An example related to engineer's qualification is engineer T's ratio of rework to defective
information. This ratio is significantly bigger than that of most of the others. This implies
that it is not often for T that he makes errors by himself. This tendency is consistent with
his high experience level and his character as a perfectionist (see table 10.1).
Looking into the distributions of U (in Project A) and NF (in Project C) reveals that the
waste indicator distribution is also affected by each engineer's role. U in Project A and
Engineer NF in Project C had similar waste indicator distributions: they are the only
engineers who had wasted his/her time in the following order.
1. Motion, 2. Rework, 3. Defective information
As can be understood in tables 10.1 and 10.3, they share the same role: they are both
responsible for engineering issues of other engineers while working on their own design
tasks. In Project B, U's waste distribution changes significantly: he/she wasted his/her time
on hand-off most. This is mainly because his/her role in Project B was project manager who
provide with the engineers tasks and necessary information including specifications.
Engineer H's waste indicator distribution in Project A is a distinct proof that the distribution
is affected by how information flows. H wasted his time on over processing most. This was
due to his working on tentative information, which was caused by late information releases
from the hardware team.
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Figure 10.7 Waste Indicator Distributions by Engineer (Project A)
Table 10.1 Each Engineer's Profile
Engineer
F Young engineer. First experience in a major software development project.
M Experienced engineer.
T Experienced engineer. Seeks for perfection in his tasks.
Y Young engineer with high motivation.
H Experienced engineer.
U Not the project manager, but leads the team in technically like a chief
engineer.
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Waste Indicator Distributions by Engineer (Project B)
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Figure 10.8 Waste Indicator Distributions by Engineer (Project B)
Table 10.2 Each Engineer's Profile (Project B)
Engineer
U Working project manager: not only manage the team, but acts like the
team's buffer. (see also table 10.1)
Y (see table 10.1)
T (see table 10.1)
F (see table 10.1)
N Experienced engineer.
J Temporary engineer. Limited experience in software engineering.
85
Waste Indicator Distributions by Engineer (Project C)
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Figure 10.9 Waste Indicator Distributions by Engineer (Project C)
Table 10.3 Each Engineer's Profile (Project C)
Engineer
KZ Young engineer with limited experience. Unfamiliar with the company's
coding rules/ design philosophy.
NF Not the project manager, but leads the team in technically like a chief
engineer.
HS Experienced engineer. No experience in the function assigned in Project C.
HG Experienced engineer. No experience in the function assigned in Project C.
IH Young engineer.
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10.3 DETAILED ANALYSIS ON EACH WASTE INDICATOR
10.3.1 OVERVIEW
The five waste indicators that were not more significant than the others (see figure 10.3),
overproduction, waiting, transportation, re-invention, and hand-off, are briefly reviewed in
this section. The top four waste indicators, over processing, motion, rework, and defective
information are analyzed in detail using the root-cause analysis diagram.
10.3.2 OVERPRODUCTION - WASTED ENGINEERING HOURS BY CAUSES
Figure 10.10 shows the relationship between wasted time on overproduction and the
corresponding causes. Overproduction was identified in Projects A and B. Unclear division
of labor was the significant cause in Project A. On the other hand, the only cause identified
in Project B was under qualification, meaning an engineer's qualification was not enough
for the assigned task.
Making use of the architecture of previous model
The engineer added source codes without fully understanding the legacy source codes,
causing redundancy source codes.
Premature architecture design
This made the architecture too complex, causing redundancy in design.
Under qualification
Inexperienced engineers tend to make redundant source codes.
Unclear division of labor
Two engineers took care of the same task unintentionally.
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Wasted Times on Overproduction and Causes
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Figure 10.10 Normalized Waste Time on Over Production per 50 Engineering Weeks
and the Corresponding Causes
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10.3.3 WAITING - WASTED ENGINEERING HOURS BY CAUSES
Figure 10.11 shows the relationship between wasted time on waiting and the corresponding
causes. Waiting was identified Projects A and B. Insufficient maintenance of development
environment and limited tools/ prototypes/ hardware were the causes respectively. This
result implies that engineers are forced to wait only in the unexpected situations in which
they encounter some hardware problems; in other situations, they switched their tasks. For
example, when some information was necessary to process a task, the engineers started
working on another one instead of waiting for the information.
Wasted Time on Waiting and Causes
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10.3.4 TRANSPORTATION - WASTED ENGINEERING HOURS BY CAUSES
Figure 10.12 shows the relationship between wasted time on transportation and the
corresponding causes. Although transportation was identified in all the three projects, their
distributions of causes were different from each other: only spatial/structural barrier was
shared by multiple projects. In Project A, Changes in design methodology and changes in
documenting / database format/ guidelines were the two significant causes. Both causes
re-formatting information (figure 10.13).
Changes in design methodology
Design methodology change was decided in favor of higher performance, causing
reformatting source codes.
Wasted Time onTransportation and Causes
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10.3.5 OVER PROCESSING
(1)Wasted Engineering Hours by Causes
Figure 10.14 shows the relationship between wasted time on over processing and the
corresponding causes. Over processing was more significant in Project A than in the other
two. (i) "Undiscovered errors in outputs from upstream", (ii) "Upstream changes/ poor
concept design/ marketing information" were the most significant causes in Project A. (iii)
"Prototype version confusion" was the most significant one in Project B.
(2) Examples of Root-Cause Analysis
The root cause analysis of the causes (i), (ii) and (iii) are quoted from the root cause
analysis diagram discussed in chapter 5 (see figure 10.14).
(i) Undiscovered errors in outputs from upstream.
As can be understood from figure 10.14, the typical root causes for this cause are the
following:
- Defective information
- Upstream task's dependency on downstream tasks for verification
- Existence of risks / uncertainties
- Limited resources (3) - Limited capacity of organization
(ii) Upstream changes/ poor concept design/ marketing information
As can be understood from figure 10.15, the typical root causes for this cause are the
following:
- PD's nature (3) - Identifying all interfaces in advance is impossible
- PD's nature (2) - Iteration cannot be eliminated
- Poor marketing information
- Poor concept design
- Poor architecture design
(iii) Prototype version confusion
As can be understood from figure 10.14, the typical root causes for this cause are the
following:
- Poor work-in-process version management
- Scattered locations
- Complex organizational structure
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- Outsourcing
- Functional organization
- Complex hierarchy structure of organization
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Figure 10.15 Part of the Root-Cause Analysis Diagram of Over Processing
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(3) Discussion
The most significant cause of over processing in Project A, "(i) Undiscovered errors in
outputs from upstream," is common in many embedded software development projects in
which both hardware and software are developed concurrently. The first two root causes,
"Defective information" and "Upstream task's dependency on downstream tasks for
verification" reveals the wasteful relationship between the hardware and the software team,
in which defective information flows down to the software team (figure 10.16). Because of
this pattern, the software team needed to waste time on defective information for which
they were not responsible. Creating defective information itself is wasteful. Passing the
defective information to downstream is also wasteful. If there had been an effective
verification processes before handing of information to the downstream team, both teams
could have reduced wasted time: the software team can reduce time on over processing, and
the hardware team can get feedback quickly. It is generally difficult to test prototype
hardware without a complete version of embedded software, but finding ways to check
errors effectively before handing off hardware prototype can reduce waste, along with
efforts to improve prototypes' quality (this is more essential), can some portion of the
wasted time of 911 hours / 50 months (figure 10.13).
The third root cause, "Existence of risks / uncertainties" cannot be controlled. However,
wasted time on over processing can be reduced by identifying risks/ uncertainties earlier by
introducing front-loaded processes including set-based concurrent engineering, or spiral
processes.
The fourth root cause, "Limited capacity of organization," may be controlled. However, it
is usually difficult because bringing up embedded software engineers takes longer time than
general software engineers because embedded software engineers need to have expertise
for specific hardware.
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H ardware Team
(ii) The verification
process between two
teams is not effective.
(i) Defective information
is created here. * Embedded Software
Team
(Wasted 911 hours)
Figure 10.16 Wasteful Information Flow without Effective Verification Proce sses
The identified root causes for the second significant cause, "(ii) Upstream changes/ poor
concept design/ marketing information," suggests that Project A's concept development
phase might have been premature. Because the project was processed without mature or
good information, the team happened to spend 195 hours /week on over processing.
However, some portion of this wasted time is caused by deterioration of information, which
is discussed in the next chapter.
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10.3.6 MOTION
(1) Wasted Engineering Hours by Causes
Figure 10.17 shows the relationship between wasted time on motion and the corresponding
causes. The top three causes for motion were (i) "Documenting", (ii) "Testing/QC" (iii)
"Meeting." In these investigations, testing/QC included only review and testing tasks
performed by other engineers. This was because self-testing activities were not clearly
distinguishable from fixing errors.
Documenting and testing/QC were the most significant causes in Projects A and C, while
they were not significant in Project B.
Wasted Time on Motion and Causes
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Figure 10.17 Normalized Waste Time on Motion per 50 Engineering Weeks and The
Corresponding Causes
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(2) Examples of Root-Cause Analysis
The root cause analysis of the causes (i), (ii) and (iii) are quoted from the root cause
analysis diagram discussed in chapter 5 (see figure 10.18).
(i) Documenting
As can be understood from figure 10.18, the typical root causes for this cause are the
following:
- Required activity
- Transportation
While documenting wastes the ongoing project's time, it may save time later in future
projects: without easy-to-access documentation, re-invention waste may occur in the future.
(ii) Testing/ QC
As can be understood from figure 10.18, the typical root causes for this cause are the
following:
-Defective information.
-Outsourcing
Testing activities are classified as waste because the better development processes are, the
less time for testing is needed. This means that a development process with long testing
time is not always a process that guarantees high quality products. Rather, it may be a poor
process whose work-in-process information's quality is poor because defective information
causes long time for testing that might have been unnecessary without defective
information.
(iii) Meeting
Not all meetings are wasteful: because well-organized meetings lead to high-quality
information transfer (Graebsch, 2005). On the other hand, meetings for unilateral
information transfer and with unnecessary attendants are wasteful, causing other wastes by
taking engineers' time.
(3) Discussion
Considering the three major causes for motion identified, measuring time spent on motion
is not a good way for waste reduction. Documenting can be considered as investment for
the future. Spending long time on testing is waste, but one of the two causes of it is
defective information, which is one of the waste indicators. In fact, in Project C, design
reviews sometimes worked as a training process. For example, many design reviews can be
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seen figure 10.19. The project spent long time on the reviews, which lasted 1.5h-2h each,
but the reviews helped KZ learn the coding guidelines and the design philosophy of the
company. Using design reviews as an opportunity for training may not always be the best
way of training, but it can also be regarded as investment for the future. Deciding whether a
meeting is wasteful or not requires a careful analysis.
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Figure 10.18 Part of the Root-Cause Analysis Diagram of Motion
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10.3.7 REWORK
(1) Rework in VSM
As can be seen in figure 10.20, rework is conspicuous in value stream maps. It can be easily
understand how time is spent on rework by taking a glance of a value stream map; in
Projects A and C, some engineers spent more than half of their time on rework.
4C 48.5 10
4 7 10 13-5 44.5 49.5 35.5 38.51
26 13 -- ~
30 5 26 24 5 Wy 22
(1211 935 (2h) 4
Rework (orange boxes)
6 1 7
8/30 39.5 7/7103 7l14bO3 45 7/21103 28 7)28 35. si/4/o 45 911 4 gri 51 82 '49/ 9/9
Figure 10.20 An Example of Rework in Value Stream Map (Project A, Engineer T)
(2) Wasted Engineering Hours by Causes
Figure 10.21 shows the relationship between wasted time on rework and the corresponding
causes. Rework was significant waste identified in Projects A and C. (i) Troubleshooting
and (ii) Defective information were the most significant reasons for wasted time on rework
in Projects A and C respectively.
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Wasted Time on Rework and Causes
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Figure 10.21 Normalized Waste Time on Rework per 50 Engineering Weeks and The Corresponding Causes
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(3) Examples of Root-Cause Analysis
The root cause analysis of the causes (i) and (ii) are quoted from the root cause analysis
diagram discussed in chapter 5 (see figure 10.22). Troubleshooting is caused by defective
information, but, in this investigation, when a engineer had spent his/her time on
troubleshooting, the wasted time was classified not as the rework time caused by defective
information, but troubleshooting. On the other hand, when a engineer had spent his/time on
fixing defective information, the wasted time was classified as rework time caused by
defective information.
(4) Discussion
Figure 10.23 explains why 861 hours are spent on troubleshooting in Project A. As can be
understood from this figure, the embedded software team needed to take care of the errors
both in hardware and software. This made troubleshooting processes complicated.
Furthermore, the software engineers had limited knowledge in the prototype hardware.
Especially the inexperienced engineers (F and Y) spent long time on identifying where bugs
are in. The quality of their work were not as high as those of experienced engineers then
(they showed notable improvement in Project B). And, their troubleshooting processes were
not as effective as those of the experienced engineers. Their lack of confidence, coming
from inexperience, sometimes made them take long time before determining who was
responsible for the bugs. It was sometimes difficult for them, partly because of the Japanese
culture, to point out errors made by hardware engineers who were more experienced. Thus,
engineers wasted 861 hours on troubleshooting.
Part of the huge wasted time on project A is considered to be caused by inexperience of
some engineers, but some portion of it might have overcome by appropriate project
management. The project managers sometimes ignored alarms by the young engineers,
having put priorities on immediate issues: this made rework discovery time longer.
Postponed rework makes time spent on it longer; this is discussed in (5).
Suggestions for reduction of troubleshooting time are the following:
1. Find ways to stop defective information flow across teams.
2. Let engineers work at their best conditions: too much overtime and excessive schedule
pressure cause low-quality outputs.
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3. Try to retrieve alarming information from engineers: hidden problems are sometimes
troublesome than visible ones. (This seems to be already realized by U in Project B)
On the other hand Project C spent 1,237 hours on rework caused by defective information.
Defective information is discusses in 10.3.9.
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(5) Changes in Rework Time
Figures 10.24 and 10.25 show changes in the average time spent on one occurrence of
rework over time. Projects A and B were put on the same graph. Project A's start week was
shifted by fifteen weeks because the tracked period started after the completion of its
investigation phase, which took about 13-151 weeks in Project B.
The two graphs proved that one occurrence of rework takes longer time near the end of a
project than at the beginning of it, and their increases are exponential. Project A's curve
fluctuated. This is because information came from the upstream team (hardware)
periodically: the software team identified rework after some information releases such as
detailed specifications releases, and prototype releases.
These results imply that problems should be identified as soon as possible. Possible
solutions are the following:
1. Introducing a suitable spiral process with frequent prototyping
2. Introducing a front loaded process such as set-based concurrent engineering
3. Trying to listen to engineers. Watching for hidden problems.
1 Not all the engineers switched themselves to the second phase at the same time in Project
B.
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Average Time Spent on One Occurrence of Rework and Week (Projects A and B)
80
70
0
60
50
a)
E
40
0
30
c 20
<10
0
1-5 6-10 11-15
67
57
43
23
12
M10
16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60
Week
[-r- Av. rework time (Project A)
Av. rework time (Project B)
Figure 10.24 Changes in Rework Time (Projects A and B)
Average Time Spent on One Occurrence of Rework and Week (Project C)
I
00 23
17
-.- --
1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30
Week
Figure 10.25 Changes in Rework Time (Project C)
108
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
=3
0
I
0)
w
E
(D
CD
Mi
0
47
A'' '
10.3.8 RE-INVENTION
Re-invention was identified only in Project A, and the identified primary root cause for it
was scattered locations. An engineer spent long time on a function that was similar to the
one developed by another engineer.
10.3.9 HAND-OFF - WASTED ENGINEERING HOURS BY CAUSES
Figure 10.26 shows the relationship between wasted time on transportation and the
corresponding causes. Transportation was significant in Project C, and the most important
cause was "Absence of task owner." This represents the situation in which an engineer is
forced to leave his/office for some period, and another engineer has to take over the absent
engineer's tasks. This happened to Project B as well. Hand-offs take long time, especially
when the previous task owner is hard to reach. Frequent hand-offs, however, leave
documentation that may be helpful in the future.
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10.3.10 DEFECTIVE INFORMATION
(1) Wasted Engineering Hours by Causes
(i) Under processing / errors/ lapses was the most significant cause for defective
information in all the three projects (figure 10.27), and the amounts of waste time in
Projects A and C by the cause were similar. Under processing means that something is
missing in the output of a task: a task that was considered to be complete is not actually
complete. (ii) Under qualification was the second significant cause for wasted time on
defective information in Projects A and C. (iii) Insufficient communication was the third
significant cause in Project A.
Wasted Time on Defective Information and Causes
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Figure 10.27 Normalized Waste Time on Defective Information per 50 Engineering
Weeks and Causes
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(2) Discussion
Although Projects A and C similarly suffered from (i) Under processing/ errors/ lapses, the
mechanism of how they wasted time was different. Project C's case was specific to
suppliers (figure 10.28). Because Company Y sells key components to Company Z,
Company Y has no reliable communication channel with user companies. This is critical for
them, for how their products are used differs among users, and many users use the products
in the ways the designers have never taken into account. For these reasons, designers in
Company Z do not exactly know every aspect of the specifications of their products. This is
similar to a case in which a user of a key uses it for opening bottles: the user may complain
about a new key that cannot be used for his/her unique purpose. Similar cases are prevalent
in Company Z's market. Company Z sets specifications of new products without
completely covering every use case. Company Y sets more detailed specifications based on
the target specifications given from Company Z. Company's engineers ask questions when
they encounter problems. This usually ends up finding that the task is more complicated
than they thought.
It is difficult for a company in similar situation to Company Y to establish reliable
communication channels with users, for all users are different, and sometimes contacting
users gives users chances to speak up, leading to more workload (adding more features, etc).
However, a part of the 547 hours wasted by (i) was wasted by not knowing the users.
Compared to this amount of time, spending time on establishing good rapport with them
with leading users by periodically visiting them would save a part of their wasted time.
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Figure 10.28 Company Y's Relationship with Users - There's Virtually No
Communication Channel with Users
10.4 SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS ON NINE WASTE INDICATORS
* Value stream mapping improved in this research was applicable for quantitative
measurements of nine waste indicators in all three projects.
" There was no need to add new types of waste indicators.
* Three waste indicators (over processing, rework, and defective information)
were more important than the others in terms of wasted engineering hours.
Motion was also significant in terms of wasted time, but analysis of its causes
revealed that trying to reduce time spent on motion is not likely to improve
product development processes significantly.
* Root cause analysis diagram was helpful for quickly identifying causes for the
occurrences of waste indicators.
* Quantitative analyses of causes for waste indicators showed different patterns
among companies and projects, proving that this methodology is helpful for a
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company to identify its specific problems.
* Additionally, the empirical idea, "Time to solve a problem increases
exponentially as time goes by," was valid in all projects.
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CHAPTER 11: RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH INVESTIGATIONS 2:
ANALYSES ON INVENTORY OF INFORMATION
11.1 OVERVIEW OF THIS CHAPTER
Inventory of information measured in the three projects are compared in 11.2 through 11.5.
Identified inventory of information is classified into thirteen types in 11.6. Three projects
are analyzed measuring inventory by types in 11.7 and 11.8. 11.9 analyzes how quickly
information got rotten in Project A. 11.10 summarizes this chapter.
11.2 NUMBER OF OCCURENCES OF INVENTORY
Figure 11.1 shows the number of occurrences of inventory of information per week in the
three projects. In Projects A and B, six engineers' activities were tracked. In project C, five
engineers were tracked (see table 9.1). Inventory was measured in units of engineering days,
and the minimum measured period was one engineering day. In Projects A and B, on
average, there was one occurrence of inventory per engineer per week. Compared to the
two projects, the frequency of occurrence of inventory was much less in Project C.
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Figure 11.1 Number of Occurrences of Inventory of Information per Week
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11.3 AVERAGE INVENTORY PERIOD
Figure 11.2 compares the average periods of inventory in the three projects. For example, in
Project A, once a task is stopped, it took twelve days on average before it is restarted. This
period is important especially in the contexts in which risks are high (see chapter 8).
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Figure 11.2 Average Periods of Inventory
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11.4 TOTAL INVENTORY TIME
Figure 11.3 compares the total inventory time per engineering week in the three projects.
Project A had five times more inventory time per week than Project C, although the sizes of
the two teams are similar (Project A: six engineers, Project B: five engineers), and they are
both in the same development phase.
Total Inventory Time per Eng. Week
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Figure 11.3 Total Inventory Time per Engineering Week
11.5 IMPLICATIONS
The result of total inventory time showed that Project A had a substantial amount of
inventory time, indicating that the team suffered low throughput. This situation resembles
that of manufacturing processes in 1980's, in which factories had huge amount of
work-in-process inventory. Goldratt (1984) attributed the situation to inappropriate
performance measurements that was prevalent then, claiming that measuring efficiencies of
machines did not lead to improving productivity, but lead to unsynchronized production
processes with huge amount of inventory. He recommended, in his theory, TOC, to measure
inventory instead of efficiencies of machines.
Today, engineer utilization levels are monitored in many product development
organizations, or at least observed by project managers and their bosses. Senior
management people tend to think that there is a chance of reduction of number of engineers
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when they see their people idle, like a plant director who sees workers taking rests. On the
other hand, idle information is not as conspicuous as idle engineers. Rather, project
managers may be blamed if they fail to give their engineers fewer tasks than they can work
on. Goldratt's suggestion was paradoxical in the manufacturing world twenty years ago:
because measurements were focused on measuring utilization levels of machines, huge
amount of inventory was not paid attention although it indicated low throughput of the
production processes. Today's product development organizations may be in the same
situation. Engineers are busy because their utilization level is monitored. On the other hand,
idleness of information, which gets rotten with time, is significant because it is not
monitored.
The results shown in figures 11.3 and 10.1 back up this idea, especially in Project A. In
project A, identified waiting of engineers was only four hours in fifty weeks. On the other
hand, information was waiting (as inventory) sixty four hours per engineering week.
Projects B and C had the same tendency, although they are not as significant. These results
imply that today's product development processes are in similar situation as manufacturing
processes twenty years ago. Toyota production system has seven wastes (Ohno, 1978).
TOC has only three metrics: throughput, inventory, and operating cost (Goldratt, 1984).
Toyota production system tries to control both waiting and inventory, while TOC ignores
waiting. The results in figures 11.3 and 10.1 implies that today's product development
activities are so premature as manufacturing a few decades ago that applying all the seven
wastes in product development is too early. The more detailed analysis of inventory in 11.8
reveals the existence of striking similarities in manufacturing processes a few decades ago
and Project A's development process.
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11.6 CLASSIFICATION OF IDENTIFIED INVENTORY
The identified inventory of information falls into the thirteen types as follows:
(1) Type 1: Taking care of a more urgent task in the project
(2) Type 2: Switching to a higher-priority task outside of the project
(3) Type 3: Waiting for information from another task
(4) Type 4: Review/ testing work
(5) Type 5: Day off
(6) Type 6: Maintenance of Documents
(7) Type 7: Rework discovery
(8) Type 8: Other engineers' availability
(9) Type 9: Downstream engineer's availability
(10) Type 10: Waiting for an answer
(11) Type 11: Ambiguous information
(12) Type 12: Limited availability of tool/board/system
(13) Type 13: Others
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(1) Type 1: Taking care of a more urgent task in the project
This occurs when a group/ an engineer needs to stop working on a process and switch to
another process in the same project because the latter process has higher priority. Typical
appearance of this in VSM is shown in figure 11.4.
interruption
interru tion
Figure 11.4 Example of Type 1 Inventory
Example from the investigation
1328 in figure 11.5 is an example of this type of inventory of information. The
implementation phase of XXX FW (XXX is a function's name; it cannot be shown due to
the confidential agreement with the company) had not been worked on for five days
because the engineer needed to finish the documentation of another task. He needed to
switch to the latter task because its due date was closer than that of the implementation
phase of XXX FW. As can be seen in figure 11.5, XXX FW was interrupted several times
mainly by tasks inside of the project.
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Figure. 11.5 1328, Inventory of Information at the Center of This Figure was Caused
by an Interrupting Event from Inside of the Project (Engineer Y, Weekil)
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(2) Type 2: Switching to a higher-priority task outside of the project
This type is the same as type (2) except that the interrupting processes do not belong to the
project. The typical appearance of this in VSM is shown in figure 11.6.
A k
r
interruption
Figure 11.6 Example of Type 2 Inventory
Example from the investigation
1408 in figure 11.7 is an example of this type of inventory of information. System-Level
Services Task was interrupted by a supporting work for another project. This interruption
caused i408.
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Figure 11.7 Example of Switching to Higher-Priority Task outside of the Project -
System-Level Services Task was Interrupted by a Support Work Outside of Project A
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(3) Type 3: Waiting for Information from another Task
This type of inventory is incurred when a task needs information from its dependent task(s)
to be processed further. The dependent task may be worked on by the same group/ engineer
((3)-i in figure 11.8) or by different one ((3)-2 in figure 11.8). In this classification, not
only waiting for information, but also for hardware prototypes that had been developed
through the project is also included because what software engineers need is the
information whether their software works on the prototype hardware.
Inventory (3)-1
Inventory (3)-2
Figure 11.8 Waiting for Information from another Task
Examples from the investigation
(1) Example of Inventory (3)-1
Figure 11.9 shows two appearances of inventory of information of this type. The two tasks
circled in this figure were testing processes; both needed an updated prototype of a
hardware component that had been developed by the hardware development team.
Especially, i539 was kept for as long as fifty four days because the hardware component it
was waiting for had been redesigned due to serious defects.
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Both Testing Processes.
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(2) Example of Inventory (3)-2
Figure 11.10 shows an example of inventory (3)-2. The task in the dashed circle was left
untouched until the downstream task got all the information it needed.
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Figure 11.10 Example of Inventory (3)-2 - the Task in the Dashed Circle was Left
Untouched until the Downstream Task Got All the Information It Needed.
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(4) Type 4: Review/ Testing Work
This type of cause was separated from type 1 because review/testing task had often (25
times) appeared throughout the development phase (figure 11.11). Review/ testing work has
high priority because of the following reasons:
- Conducting it earlier reduces rework discovery time.
- Several tasks may be processed based on tentative information from the task yet to be
reviewed.
- Some types of reviewing involve several busy key-players, causing difficulty in making
date changes.
Examples from the investigation
Figure 11.11 shows examples of inventory of information caused by review/ testing work.
1016 was caused solely by an external specifications review work. The interrupted task was
additionally interrupted by two other external specifications reviews, one code review, and
some other tasks. Since this engineer's role is working manager, he could scarcely have
concentrated on one design task without interruptions.
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Figure 11.11 Example of Inventory Caused by Review! Testing Work
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(5) Type 5: Day Off
Although day offs is not waste of engineering hours, they cause inventory of information.
Figure 11.12 shows an example of inventory caused by day off - XXX DC CAL Design/
Implementation task was interrupted by a week off. Since the engineer took a week off then,
the total labor hours was zero (see the number in orange in figure 11.12).
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11.12 Example of Inventory Caused by Day Off - PMU DC CAL Design/
Implementation Task was Interrupted by a Week Off.
128
xy )(XX CAl U1
26
38.5 10/7/02
Figure
iA Q-d
11/25
a 16
(6)Type 6: Maintenance of Documents
As is shown in figure 11.13, this type of inventory appears when engineers postpone
documentation and its completion. Although Glodratt (1997) argues that documentation
should not be done immediately after every task because it can cause delay on the critical
path, delay in documentation could incur time to remember and memory loss.
Inventory
caused by
postponing
documentation
Inventory
caused by
postponing
completion of
documentation
Figure 11.13 Inventory of Information Caused by Maintenance of Documenting
Example from the investigation
Figure 11.14 shows examples of inventory of information caused by postponing
documentation.
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Figure 11.14 Example of Inventory of Information Caused by Maintenance of
Documenting
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(7)Type 7: Rework Discovery
This inventory appears when a task that was perceived to be completed is reworked (figure
11.15). Since this inventory is related to rework discovery time - one of the important
metrics in system dynamics - reduction of this inventory could prevent rework caused by
"upstream changes" (pp. x) and rework caused by "working on unreliable/defective info."
Perceived to be
completed at this
time
I
Rewor is
discovered
Figure 11.15 Inventory of Information Caused by Rework Discovery
Example from the investigation
Figure 11.16 shows an example of inventory of information caused by rework discovery. In
this case, a task needed to be reworked because the engineer was notified a change in H/W
design on which his task was dependent.
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Figure 11.16 Example of Inventory of Information Caused by Rework Discovery
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(8) Type 8: Other Engineers' Availability
Example from the investigation
Working in a team, sometimes tasks need to be stopped until its output is confirmed
acceptable for the upstream engineer. This can take long because the needed engineer may
have some high-priority tasks. Figure 11.17 shows an example of this type. In this case, the
testing task needed to be reviewed by another engineer who is taking care of its dependent
task. If the needed engineer is to process a downstream task, inventory of information is
classified as (9): downstream engineer's availability.
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Figure 11.17 Example of Inventory of Information Caused by Other Engineer's
Availability
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(9) Type 9: Downstream Engineer's Availability
As is shown in figure 11.18, this type of inventory appears when handed-off information is
left untouched for some period.
Downstream engineer is not
available for task B.
Figure 11.18 Inventory of Information Caused by Downstream Engineer's Availability
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Example from the investigation
Figure 11.19 shows an example of this type. In this case, it took nine days before the
engineer used the information from the H/W team.
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Figure 11.19 Example of Inventory of Information Caused by Downstream Engineer's
Availability
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(10) Type 10: Waiting for an answer
As is shown in figure 11.20, this type of inventory occurs when an engineer finds a
question, which takes some time before he/she gets an answer for it.
Inquiy / swer
Inventory of information caused by
waiting for an answer
Figure 11.20 Inventory of Information Caused by Waiting for an Answer
Example from the investigation
In the case shown in figure 11.21, the engineer found an error that was not caused by his
software. Thinking that there is something wrong in the hardware, He reported it to the
H/W engineer. The task could not be processed until this software engineer got an answer.
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Figure 11.21 Example of Inventory of Information Caused by Waiting for an Answer
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(11) Type 11: Ambiguous information
This type of inventory of information occurs when engineers find the information on his
hand too unclear or unreliable to be used.
Example from the investigation
In the case shown in figure 11.22, an engineer stopped processing two tasks because he
found the related specifications unclear.
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Figure 11.22 Example of Inventory of Information Caused by Ambiguous Information
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(12) Type 12: Limited availability of toollboardlsystem
Example from the investigation
In the example shown in figure 11.23, a limited number of prototype H/W boards were
shared by the software team, causing inventory of information against engineers' will.
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Figure 11.23 Example of Inventory of Information Caused by Limited Availability of
Tool/Board/System
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11.7 DISTRIBUTION OF INVENTORY TYPES AMONG ENGINEERS
Figures 11.24, 11.25, and 11.26 compare the distributions of types of inventory of
information by engineers. These results revealed that the distributions differ among
engineers and projects.
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Figure 11.24 Distribution of Types of Inventory (Project A)
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Figure 11.26 Distribution of Types of Inventory (Project C)
11.8 ANALYSIS ON INVENTORY OF INFORMATION BY ITS TYPES
11.8.1 NUMBER OF OCCURENCES
Figure 11.27 compares the three project's number of occurrences of inventory by types. In
Project A, type 1, taking care of a more urgent task in the project, was the most frequent
type of inventory. In Project B, type 2, switching to higher-priority task outside of the
project, was the most frequent inventory of information, implying that the engineers were
frequently interrupted by other commitments. Project C had no outstanding type of
inventory in terms of number of occurrences, the most frequent one being type 1.
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Figure 11.27 Normalized Occurrences of Inventory of Information per 50 Engineering Weeks and the Corresponding
Types
11.8.2 AVERAGE INVENTORY PERIODS
Figure 11.28 compares the three project's average lengths of inventory by types. In Project
A, "Ambiguous information (type 11)," "Rework discovery (type 7)," and "Waiting for
information from another task (type 3)," were the most outstanding ones with about the
average of forty engineering days. This is because the embedded software team depends on
its upstream process, hardware development. Rework discovery sometimes take long time
because some types of bugs in software cannot be identified without hardware prototypes.
Software engineers sometimes suspend their tasks until prototypes become available.
Project B had much less average inventory periods of the three types above. This was
mainly because there were no major changes in hardware specifications. Project C was
similar to Project B in terms of the three types of inventory, for the project did not involve
major hardware changes. In Project C, downstream engineer's availability (type 9) caused
the longest average inventory period, 21 days. This implies that Project C is managed in a
way not to interrupt engineers.
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11.8.3 TOTAL INVENTORY TIME
The overall inventory time by types is shown in figure 11.29. The two most significant
types of inventory in Project A were "Taking care of a more urgent task in the period (Type
1)" and "Waiting for information from another task (type 2)." The two types take about 2/3
of the total inventory time of Project A. Project B had the longest inventory time in
"Switching to higher-priority task outside of the project" (type 2) of all the three projects.
11.8.4 OVERALL DISCUSSION
Figure 11.30 describes unsynchronized production processes described in "The Goal"
(Goldratt, 1984), in which throughput is low although all machines are busy. Goldratt
attributes this situation to the production management prevalent in 1980's, in which
inventory is not measured. In such unsynchronized production processes, the measurements
of utilization levels leads only to local optimization, leading to production of huge amount
of work-in-process inventory. In figure 11.30, WIP (a) is waiting because Machine A is
busy with other WIP. WIP (c) is waiting because other parts necessary for assembly are
missing.
Project A is in a similar situation (figure. 11.31). WIP (a) in figure 11.30 corresponds to
information inventory (a), which is type 1 inventory and WIP (c) in figure 11.30,
information inventory (c). Therefore, Project A, with high amount of types 1 and 2
inventory, is considered to be as less productive as the manufacturing process in figure
11.30.
Morgan (2002) listed "over utilization" as one of twelve product development process
wastes, arguing utilization level over 80% significantly decreases the system's throughput.
Project A's unsynchronization implies that the project chronically suffered over utilization.
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WIP (c) is waiting because
other parts are missing
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Machine A is busy with ot
WIP
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Machine B:
BUSY
Machine B is
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unnecessary
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stoppage is to be
penalized
Machine A:
BUSY
Customer X
X Customer Y
Customer Z
Huge inventory
of final product
because of the
product was
not pulled by
the market or
lost its value
because of too
long lead time
Machine A needed to
stop working on (a)
because working on (b)
was necessary to fill the
empty bin.
Paradox
Low throughput of value (products that
can be sold at high price) in spite of
every machine's high utilization ratio.
Figure 11.30 Unsynchronized Manufacturing Process Described in "The Goal"
(Goldratt, 1984).
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Info. Inventory (c) - type 2
Information is waiting for other
necessary information.
Info. Inventory (a) is waiting
because Engineer A is taking
care of more urgent task: info.
inventory (b).
Info. Inventory (a) -
type I
Hight
represents
inventory
tEi
Info.
Inventory (b)
iT
Empty! ,'
__44k
Engineer B:
BUSY
Customer X
w--- Customer Y
'' Customer Z
Low-value
product
Machine B is producing
unnecessary information
because his/her utilization
level is monitored in some
ways
Engineer A:
BUSY
Engineer A needed to stop
working on (a) because working
on (b) was necessary to create
the information engineer B
wanted.
Paradox
Low throughput of value (products that
can be sold at high price) in spite of hard
working of every engineer
Figure 11.31 Unsynchronized Development Process of Project A
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11.9 ROTTEN AND FRESH INVENTORY
11.9.1 RATIO OF ROTTEN INVENTORY AND TIME
Investigation in rotten inventory was performed based on the idea described in chapter 8.
Figure 11.32 shows the percentage of rotten information identified in Project A; only 5 %
was found to be partially or completely rotten. Figure 11.33 shows changes in ratio of
rotten inventory of information with time. This figure reveals that the ratio of rotten
inventory increased with time, and almost twenty percent of information got rotten when it
was kept for three to four engineering weeks. Figure 11.34 shows the trend line of the
relationship between the ratio of rotten information and time. The trend line was the
following:
y = 0.0054x + 0.8094 (Equation 11.1)
Ratio of Rotten Inventory to Fresh Inventory (Number) of
Ocurrences
5%
* Rotten
* Fresh
95%
Figure 11.32 Ratio of Rotten Inventory of Information in Number (Project A)
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Ratio of Rotten Inventory
0 Fresh Inventory
0 Rotten Inventory
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1-3 4-7 8-10 11-20 21-30 31-
Inventory Time [Eng. Day]
Figure 11.33 Changes in Ratio of Rotten Inventory of Information with Time
(Project A)
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Ratio of Rotten Inventory and Inventory Time
60%
y = 0.0054x + 0.0356
50%
R2 =0.8094
* 40% - --
30%
0
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10%
0%*
0 20 40 60 80 100
Inventory Time [Eng. Day]
Figure 11.34 Trend Line of Changes in Ratio of Rotten Inventory with Time (Project
A)
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11.9.2 RATIO OF LOST VALUE IN ROTTEN INFORMATION
Rework Ratio can be calculated with the following equation:
Rework Ratio = (Time Spent on Rework)/(Time Spent on Original Work)
(Equation 11.2)
Figure 11.35 shows the relationship between rework ratio and inventory time of all the
rotten information in Project A; there was no strong correlation between them. The
average rework ratio was 53%.
Rework Ratio and Inventory Time
A A A
A
--Average:53%
A
A
A
20 40 60
A
80 100
Inventory Time [Eng. Days]
Figure 11.35 Changes in Rework Ratio with Time
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11.9.3 MONTHLY INTEREST RATE CALCULATION
Because the rotten inventory increased linearly with time (equation 11.1), and the rework
ratio had no correlation with time, inventory of information can be considered to have some
interest rate. The monthly interest rate can be calculated with the following equation:
0.0054[/ Eng. Day] * 21 [Eng. Day / Eng. Month] * 0.53= 6% [/ Eng. Month]
(Equation 11.3)
This implies that if information is kept as inventory for a month, engineers need to work
extra 6% on average to make up for the loss.
This interest rate is considered to be useful for re-designing organizational structures:
products in the highly unstable market should have processes in which the amounts of
inventory of information are minimized.
11.9.4 TYPES OF ROTTEN INVENTORY -- DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF ROTTEN
INVENTORY
Figure 36 shows the ratios of rotten inventory by their types. 56% of "Rework discovery"
(type 7) were rotten; 44% of rework discovery occurred due to hidden errors in the
information itself. Rotten information was also identified in waiting "Waiting for
information from another task" (type 3), "Day off" (type5), "Switching to higher-priority
task outside of the project" (type 2), and "Taking care of a more urgent task in the project"
(type 1).
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Figure 11.36 Relationships between Ratio of Rotten Inventory and the Corresponding
Types
11.10 SUMMARY OF THIS CHAPTER
Value stream mapping was also applicable for quantitative measurements of information
inventory. Quantitative measurements revealed how much and why engineers' activities are
interrupted - this result can help companies revise their future strategies in project
management, scheduling, prioritization, and resources allocation. The analysis suggested
that Project A' information flows resembled those typical in manufacturing factory several
decades ago.
Rotten information was identified and measured in Project A. On average, 6 % of value
adding effort became waste if the output information had been stored for a month in project
A.
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CHAPTER 12 FUTURE WORK
12.1. NINE WASTE INDICATORS
The three waste indicators, over processing, rework, and defective information were more
prevalent of all nine waste indicators in the three projects investigated in this research. Still,
the results of three investigations are not sufficient to justify ignoring the waste indicators
that were not significant in them. Performing more case studies, especially fields other than
development processes of embedded software, will be effective for reduction of waste
indicators.
12.2 INVENTORY OF INFORMATION
Inventory of information was found to be prevalent in all the three projects, and the study in
one of the projects revealed that information got rotten rapidly. Although a specific interest
rate was deduced, this interest rate is expected to depend on contexts specific to projects.
Another topic related to the interest rate of information inventory is the exploring the
relationship between the interest rate of information inventory (X in figure 12.1) and the
reduction of released product's value (Y in figure 12.2). X's causes include market,
requirement, and technical risk and Y's cause is market risk. Therefore, X and Y should be
correlated and X should be more than Y. Deducing X needs drawing a value stream map; Y
can be deduced from sales information, which takes less effort. If the correlation between X
and Y becomes known, X, which is useful for re-designing organizations, can be deduced
without detailed analysis requiring value stream mapping.
Information's value
X% LOSS
1 ENG. MON. Time
Figure 12.1 Interest Rate of Information Inventory
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Product's value
Y% LOSS
Minor Change Major Change Time
Figure 12.2 Reduction of Released Product's Value
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12.3 SUBSTITUTING TASK INVENTORY FOR INFORMATION
Task inventory is idle tasks that are ready to be worked on by engineers. Task inventory can
be counted by engineers. It can also be counted with a value stream map; in figure 12.3,
inventoried tasks of this engineer on 2/19 are six. Counting task inventory is easier than
measuring inventory time, which is performed in this research. However, unlike in
manufacturing, time needed for a task varies significantly. And, engineers tend to start
working on the easiest task. Therefore, numbers of inventoried tasks may not have the same
meaning throughout a project. However, investigation of the correlation between
information inventory and task inventory may verify the possibility of replacing
information inventory with task inventory.
4 y Meetng
213 21 It inventory 2a
ILi-07 &lay :4 22
engineer N s ctIvlties i
In ProjecB " -neno- Ox
S 4 th inventory)-roto 0, hIo 13
4 5 inventory 3 i 8 8 ur 4 t
12 4 1
__________ 110 e k yMee~ngProftty ..eaClr
Q&UfqU 6  irwentory1s2 71 220 epbn o on10 h26h40
Figure 12.3 Counting Task Inventory with a Value Stream Map (Project B) - Task
Inventory Can be Calculated by Counting Green or Red Lines Crossing a Day.
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12.4 ARE TOC'S THREE METRICS SUFFICIENT?
Analysis of Project A (see chapter 11) revealed that the project's development process is
similar to the manufacturing process described in "The Goal" (Goldratt, 1984). This implies
that the three metrics (throughput, inventory, and operating expense) of Theory of
Constraints (TOC) (Goldratt) may be sufficient for addressing waste in Today's product
development processes. Verification of this idea needs the following processes.
1. Defining "throughput" in product development processes.
2. Test the three metrics for measuring waste in product development processes.
3. Examine the three metrics address most of waste in product development
processes.
12.5 SHOWING WASTED TIME EXPLICITLY IN VALUE STREAM MAPS
In chapter 7, wasted time was explicitly displayed in value stream maps (figure 12.4).
Although this technique was not applied in drawing value stream maps in this research, it
may make wasted time more distinct from value-adding time.
Wasted time is this period
Creating the sam
Non
Value-Adding
Work
Wasted Engineering Time
information
Figure 12.4 Measuring Time Spent on Overproduction - A Hatched Process Box Mean
Overproduction (Same as Figure 7.1)
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12.6 EXPLORATION OF ENGINEER UTILIZATION LEVELS
The value stream maps in this research have all the information necessary for measuring
engineer utilization levels. Measuring utilization levels, which was not performed in this
research, may make it clear how utilization levels affect product development processes.
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CHAPTER 13 CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions from the Perspective of This Research's Goal
" The nine plus one waste indicators for measurement of waste were determined based
on the analyses of causal relationships among various factors of low performances in
product development processes.
" As a result of these analyses, the root-cause analysis diagram was produced. The
diagram was a database of causal relationships among factors of low performances.
" The value stream mapping for quantitative measurement of waste was developed
through preliminary case studies. A process for measuring waste with waste indicators
and value stream mapping was developed.
* These tools and processes have successfully been applied to three industrial case
studies in two companies, in which value stream maps have been developed through
intensive interviews with project managers and engineers.
" The three case studies has proved the following:
* The nine waste indicators were sufficient for identifying and measuring
waste in product development processes.
" Inventory of information was prevalent in product development
processes.
* The root-cause analysis diagram was useful for identifying typical
root-causes for waste.
" The lean tools and processes developed in this research have proved to be able to
identify problems both peculiar and common to the organizations.
" Therefore, these lean tools and processes can deliver to product development
organizations information that leads to continuous improvement of their value-creating
processes.
Findings and Implications
* Among the nine waste indicators, three waste indicators, over processing, rework, and
defective information were more significant than the others, implying the possibility of
reducing the number of waste indicators.
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" It has been proved that time per one occurrence of rework exponentially increases as
time spent on the project increases.
* Analysis of inventory of information has revealed that the development processes of
the investigated projects has turned out more or less similar to the unsynchronized
manufacturing processes several decades ago.
* In one of the investigated projects, information got rotten at the rate of 6% a month.
This indicates information inventoried for a month causes additional engineering work
by 6%.
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APPENDIX I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The goal of this research is to develop a process for continuous creation of lean value in
product development organizations. Creation of lean value means realizing value with
minimum wasteful process.
To achieve this goal, the objective of this research was determined to develop ideas and
methodologies of lean product development into tools and processes that can help product
development organizations (1) identify and measure the waste in their teams' processes; (2)
identify causes and measure their impacts on PD processes; and (3) finally learn the best
strategies to pursue to improve their PD processes.
2. RESEARCH PROCESS
2.1 Define nine plus one waste indicators for waste measurement (table A-1).
Table A-1 Nine plus One Waste Indicators
1. Overproduction of Information (Duplication) Different people/groups are unintentionally creating the same
information.
2. Waiting of People People are waiting.
3. Transportation of Information (Preparing and Information is in transportation.
forwarding information)
4. Over Processing Engineers create information that won't contribute the value of
product.
5. Motion of People (Information hunting, travel, reviews, People have to spend time on non value-adding motions.
documentation, and meetings)
6. Rework Redoing tasks perceived to be finished for some reason
7. Re-Invention Designing similar things without utilizing past experience.
8. Hand-Off (Hand-off inside of project) Information is handed off with its responsibility between two
groups/people.
Erroneous or incomplete information.9. Defective Information (Coupled to Over Processing
and Rework)
Inventory of Information i Work-in-process inventory of information.
163
DescriptionWaste Indicator
C,0
0
Cn
2.2 Create the root-cause analysis diagram that is useful for quickly identify
root-causes for waste (figure A-1).
Waste indicator 4
(effect)
Specifying Too
Musch Detail
Processing
Intermediate Causes
* Root Cause
Individual Designer's
Poor Understanding
of Downstream 
-- rUiications
Tasks Lack of of Designers(e - Ma.nutacEperunce
Lack of Constructive Designers
Advice from IRaaourcea(1)
Expeiencd -4System Over
Designers Insufficient Time UtilzationDasitiners ~AdvicelAsking lsftetlm
No Level Scheduling
FL __ __
Irgaucauronal
SpatialStructura Structure
Barrier
Scattering Locations
Outsourcing
Corporate Cultum
-] Ormzational
Comp Hierarchy
SpatiaVStructurul
Barie ScttrinV Lcaton
F-Lunc.i
Figure A-1 An Example of Root-Cause Analysis Chart
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2.3 Optimize value stream mapping for measuring waste identified by the nine plus
one waste indicators (figure A-2).
aon (61)
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Figure A-2 An Example of the Value Stream Map for Quantitative Analysis
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3. RESULTS1: NINE WASTE INDICATORS
The value stream mapping improved in this research made it possible to measure waste
time on each category of waste (figure A-3). These results revealed that "Over Processing,"
"Rework", and "Defective Information" are more prevalent that the other waste indicators.
Wasted Tirnes per 50 Eng. Weeks and Waste Indicators
2500 2357
~ 15001438
LU
01500
1000
500
z
871 24
760343
135 192 94145 111
180 17 12 9 22 0 0
978 o ProjectB
0 ProjectC
00 0 0 C
%0.
Waste Indicators
Figure A-3 Relationship between Wasted Time and Nine Waste Indicators
Detailed analyses using the root-cause analysis diagram made it possible to identify
problems specific to each company and show how many hours are wasted on them. (Figure
A-4).
Hardware Team
The verification process
,, is not effective.
Embedded Software * i.
Team
Embedded Software
Team
Flow of defective information (Wasted 861 hours)
Figure A-4 An Example of Identified Problem
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One occurrence of rework turned out to take more time near the end of projects than at the
beginning of it (figure. A-5).
Average Time Spent on One Occurrence of Rework and Week (Projects A and B)
-*-Av. rework time (Project A)
-0-Av. rework time (Project B)
20 - - -
5
10 __
06
1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60
Week
Figure A-5 Average Time Spent on One Occurrence of Rework
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4. RESULTS2: INVENTORY OF INFORMATION
4.1 TOTAL INVENTORY TIME
Figure A-6 shows the total inventory Especially, Project A's inventory time was significant:
64 engineering - day inventory time in a engineering week on average (it had 6 engineers).
Total Inventory Time per Eng. Week
70 F 64
60 -
50
40 - ProjectAl
30 l Project B
30 Lm-i Project C
20 13
10
0
Total Inventory Time / Eng. Week
Figure A-6 Total Inventory Time per Engineering Week: Number of Engineers in
Projects A, B, and C are 6, 6, and 5 Respectively.
4.2 INVENTORY TIME AND THE CORRESPONDING TYPES
Figure A-7 shows the relationship between inventory time and the types of inventory of
information. As can be understood from this graph, the following two types were dominant
in Project A.
Type 1: Taking care of a more urgent task in the project
Type 2: Waiting for information from another task
This result implies that Project A's development process was an unsynchronized one: In
Project A, although engineers were switching tasks frequently not to delay the project,
many tasks were not able to be started because some information was missing. This
tendency resembles the manufacturing processes several decades ago.
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4.2 ROTTEN INVENTORY
Figure A-8 shows how the number of rotten inventory increases with time. Figure A-9
shows the relationship between rework ratio and time. Rework ratio is defined by the
following equation:
Rework Ratio = (Time Spent on Rework) / (Time Spent on Original Work)
Monthly interest rate of information inventory can be calculated as follows:
0.0054[/ Eng. Day] * 21 [Eng. Day / Eng. Month] * 0.53= 6% [/ Eng. Month]
If information is kept as inventory for a month, engineers need to work extra 6% on
average to make up for the loss.
Ratio of Rotten Inventory and Inventory Time
60%
y = 0.0054x + 0.035650% 
--_ 
-- R = 0_0%
2, 2 _ _ _
> 40% -
30%
020%
10% - - - -
0%
0 20 40 60 80 1001
Inventory Time [Eng. Day]
Figure A-8 Trend Line of Changes in Ratio of Rotten Inventory with Time (Project A)
Rework Ratio and Inventory Time
100% A A A
90% - - -
60% 
-
o50% ---- - ag~-- 
-__ 
_
& 40% - - -- -- - __30%
20% -- -
10% -
0 20 40 60 80 100
Inventory Time [Eng. Days]
Figure A-9 Changes in Rework Ratio with Time (Project A)
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5. CONCLUSION
Overall
" The lean tools and processes developed in this research have proved to be able to
identify problems both peculiar and common to the organizations.
" Therefore, these lean tools and processes can deliver to product development
organizations information that leads to continuous improvement of their value-creating
processes.
Nine Waste Indicators
* The nine waste indicators were sufficient for identifying and measuring waste in product
development processes.
* Among the nine waste indicators, three waste indicators, over processing, rework, and
defective information were more significant than the others, implying the possibility of
reducing the number of waste indicators.
Rework
N It has been shown that time per one occurrence of rework exponentially increases as
time spent on the project increases.
Inventory of Information
" Inventory of information was prevalent in product development processes.
" Analysis of inventory of information has revealed that the development processes of
the investigated projects have turned out more or less similar to the unsynchronized
manufacturing processes several decades ago.
" In one of the investigated projects, information got rotten at the rate of 6% a month.
This indicates information inventoried for a month causes additional engineering work
by 6%.
Root-Cause Analysis Diagram
E The root-cause analysis diagram was useful for identifying typical root-causes for waste.
Value Stream Mapping for Quantitative Analysis
N Value Stream Mapping Optimized for Quantitative Analysis was applicable for
measuring waste using the waste indicators.
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APPENDIX II ROOT-CAUSE ANALYSIS DIAGRAM
1. OVERPRODUCTION
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Premature Architecture
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Schedule Acheduling
9.Defective
Information
- Happenings Unidentified
Risks/Uncertainties
Limited
Resources(7)
Limited Tools /
Prototypes /
Hardware
Insufficient
Maintenance of
Development
Environment
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3. TRANSPORTATION
3
Transportation 4
of Information
Root-Cause
There' s No Perfect Suite
Tranporatio MaualHanding Use f Nn-EProduct
of Trnforation M-ao nformationg Uscuments 4 Adopting Applications Software Industry' s
itself From Different Dynamic Condition
Imperfect Software Companies
Compatibility of ,_Legacy from Past
Different Developments
Platforms/Software
Difference from Outsoucing
Suppliers' Platforms Frequent Version-Ups
Changes in Documenting
/Database Format /
Guidelines
-reformatting Td
Changes in Design
Methodology
Complex Organizational
Structure
Scattering Locations
Spatial/Structural Barrier 1Outsourcing
-E Complex Hierarchy
Structure of Organization
Functional Organization
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Inside the Organization -o
No Sure/Reliable
Communication Channel
Outside of the Organization 4
Expertise needs to be
shared among remote Spatial/Structural Barrier
locations
Lack or Lack of strict
Enforcement of
Reading/Replying Rules
No Suitable Communication
Tool for the Specific
Purpose
Having no direct business
relation (e.g. supplier and
user)
Complex Organizational
Structure
Scattering Locations
Outsourcing
Complex Hierarchy
Structure of Organization
Functional Organization
Education / Training F
I Spatial/Structural Barrier
Using New Engineers
New area to the engineer
Complex Organizational
Structure
Scattering Locations
Outsourcing
Complex Hierarchy
Structure of Organization
Functional Organization
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Tardy Approval
Process i
Root-Cause4 OVER PROCESSING
Individual Designer' s
Poor Understanding
of Downstream
Tasks
(e.g. Manufacturing)
Lack of Constructive
Advice from
Experienced
Designers
Limited
Resources(2)
4 Limited Qualifications
Lack of of Designers
Experienced
Designers Limited
Resources(1)
System Over
ANo Time org Insufficient Time Utilization
No Level Scheduling
Local Over Limited
Utilization Resources(2)
Limited Qualifications
of Designers
Complex
Organizational
Spatial/Structural Structure
Barrier
fusurcing
Corporate Culture
Complex
Organizational
Structure
Complex Hierarchy
Structure
SaSpatial/Structuralt
BarrierSatrngotis
Functional
Organization
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Specifying Too
Musch Detail 4
4.Over
Processing
Limited
Resources(1)
Doneam' No Time System Over
Available for Utilization
.Mnuacurng Interaction with Insufficient Tim~eCommitment to Downstream Local Over No Level Scheduling
Design (Manufacturing) Utilization -
Limited
Resources(2)
Limited Qualifications
of Designer
Setting Too There' s No Time forSmall Optimization
Tolerances
Designing
Features That is
Not Specified by
- Specification
(Different from
Spec.)
Limited
Resources(1)
System Over
Insufficient Tim: Utilization
No Level Scheduling
Local Over Limited
Utilization Resources(2)
Limited Qualifications
of Designers
Lack of Limited
Empirical 4Resources(2)
Knowledge Limited Qualificationsof Designers
Poor Buffer Distribution of Poor Schedule/
Slack(Or Buffer) Allocation BufferskEve Progress Control
Time
-A Becomes
Self-Fulfilling No Incentive for Impractical Incentive/
Prophesy MeasurementPropesy arlyFinih 4System
Highly Competitive
Market
B to C
Instability of Market
182
Unclear/ Existence of
Shifting Goal Uncertainty
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Customer' s Poor
Exogenous - Understanding of the
Factors FMarket
-B to B
Highly Competitive
Market
Culnconsistency inCustomer' s Decision
Complexity of Lack of Modularity
the Product
Endogenous Nature of the Product
Factors
Low TRL Risk-Taking Strategy
Poor Understanding
of Current
Technology
Inadequate
D eve opme' nIt T im e
Underbid
Inadequate Decision
Process
Tardy Decision
Prces F Inadequate
- Scheduling
Technique
Technological
Underestimation Uncertainty
-of Development
Cost _Lack of Feedbk
Insufficient
Pervasion of
Goal Information
Poor Marketing Inadequate
Marketing Method
Lack oFDFM
Lack of Lack of Concurrent
--- Feedback Loop Engineering
Waterfall Process
without Proper
Prototyping
Limited
Resources(1)Insufficient Time System Over
to Read/ Utilization
-Examine/ fnsufficient Time
Release
Information No Level Scheduling
Local Over
Utilization Limited
-Resources(2)
Limited Qualifications
of Designers
Complex
Organizational
Structure
Scattering Location
Outsourcing ]
Spatial/Structural
Barrier Complex Hierarchy
Structure of
Organization
Functional
Organization
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Lack ofMeasurement of
Designer' s
Achievements in
U esines Terms of Goal
U co fG  u s Perfectionist
Personality of
Engineer
Complex
Organizational
Structure
-Scattering Locations
Tardy Spatial/Structural Outsourcing
- Information Barrier usrcn
Transfer
Complex Hierarchy
Structure ofPoor Availability 
-Organizationof Necessary -4----_Ognzt
Info.
Functional
Organization
Tardy
-Information Imperfect HumanTransfer Relationship
PD's Nature(2)
Iteration cannot be
eliminated
Optimization Interfa ce eiiae
Process Redesign PD's Nature(3)
Identifying All Interfaces
In Advance is Impossible
Changes Poor Marketing
Poor Information Quality Information
from Upstream Phases Premature Concept
Design
Premature Architecture
Design
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Poorly
manufactured 1 Veniication Upstream Task's
Prototype Performed by Dependency on
Late /Lack Downstream Downstream Tasks
- Verification Tasks for Verification(E.G.
Process Manufacturability)
Undiscovered Verification by
Errors in Independent Existence Of
Outputs from Process Uncirtaintles/R4sks
Upstream (Teaing,etc.)
Verified by Limited
Extemal Resources(3)
9. Defective Organization/ Limited Capability of
Information People Organization
Limited
Resources(1)
Concurrent Engineering(2) System OverOverlapping Information Pulled Before UtilizationSchedule Validation and/or Optimization (Unrealistic
of Design Parameter Sets Schedule)
Highly Competitive Market
Too Much Concurrency
(Complex product or Low-
TRL)
Prototype Poor
-- Version rk-in-Process Version
Confusion Management
Scattered
Insufficient/ No Spatial Locations
Communication Barrier
-_ --- Complex
Organizational
Structure
Outsourcing J
-Functional Organization
Complex Hierarchy
Structure of Organization
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Working on
Unreliable/ +
Defective Info.
Being Forced to Use Non-
Ideal Tools /Prototypes/ 4
Hardware
Manual Data Imperfect
Conversion Compatibility of
(E.G. Different
Peformatting) Platforms/Software
Creating a
workaround
solution
Limited
Resources(7)
Limited Tools!
Prototypes I
Hardware
Adopting
Applications From
Different Software
Companies
Difference from
Suppliers' +-
Platforms
There' s No Perfect
Suite Product
Software Industry' s
Dynamic Condition
Legacy Data from
Past Developments
Outsourcing
Frequent
Version-Ups
Defective
information found 10.Defectlve
in handed-off Information
information
Incomplete concept
Needed developmentinformation was
not identified in
project planning -Low TRL
Needed - Originally Unoptimizd
L information not +- unsynchroniQed _ [scheduling technique
available
.Needed Delay in Unsynchronized 10epouto
- information upstream proes Unsynchronized
was to be fed pcsss ross because of waste 2.aiin
in UPStream1
proce Isses 
-3.Transportation
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Being Forced to Use Non-
Ideal Tools /Prototypes/ 4
Hardware
Manual Data Imperfect Adopting
Conversion Compatibility of Applications From(E.G. Different Different Software
Peformatting) Platforms/Software Companies
Difference from
Suppliers'
Platforms
Defective
Information found 9.Defective
in handed-off Information
Information
Incomplete concept
Neededdevelopmentinformation wasdvlpmn
~not Identified In
project planningTRL
Needed Originally UnoptImIzd
information not unsynchronizIe~d*_ schedulIng technique
avaiabl 1 
. Needed Delay In Unsynchronized 
.. vrrouto
- information upstream o nsynchronized
was to be fed iprocesses prbes bcause Af waste 2.+tnin upstream
processes 
-3.Transportation
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Limited
Resources(7)
Limited Tools/
Prototypes /
Hardware
There' s No Perfect
Suite Product
Software Industry' a
Dynamic Condition
Legacy Data from
Past Developments
Outsourcing
Frequent
Version-Ups
Creating a
workaround
solution
Design
technique/
philosophy not
consistent with
the
organization' s
way
In icnt No
Communication
5. Motion
6. Rework
7. Re-invention
8. Hand-Off.
9. Defective
Information
Lack of basic training
Lack of documentation of
structured design rules
Scattered
Spatial Locations
Barrier Complex
Organizational
Structure
Outsourcing
- - Functional Organization
Complex Hierarchy
Structure of Organization
Schedule Too Tight Limited Resources (1)
Pressure 4-- (Unrealistic) 4 System Over Utilization
Highly Competitive
Market
Time-Sensitive Product
Way- InadequateScheduling
Schedule Technique
Strategically
Processing Intention to Existence of Risks/
Multiple Reduce Risk, Uncertainties
Solutions
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Creating Needless 4-Information
5 MOTION
5.Motion +-
Need to Leam Inexperience of
--- from Basic - engineer o
Knowledge
Stop-and-Go
Tasks
Root-Cause
Knowledge is NOT No experience in the areaInside of 4 (Now Field to the
Information Organization Dispersed Information Organization)
Hunting -- - w/o Maintained
Knowledge is Inside lndex(Paper,Electronic)
of he rgaizaionDifficulty to find the Poor Knowledge
Right Person Management
Difficulty to Reach the
Right Person
Using New Engineers
New area to the engineer
Concurrent Engineering(1) Critical Design isues
- (Designers Get Involved in Overuse of DesignersProduction' s/User' s Problem) 
- (Should be done by other
engineers)
Others
Limited Resources(1)
System Over Utillization
Suitable (Unrealistic Schedule)
Designer' s 4- --
_-- 
- - - Fatigue
Unmpoal Poor Resource Allocation
UnavailbilityLocal Over
Utillization No Level Scheduling
Limited Resources(2)
Limited Qualification of
Designers
Limited Resources(2)
No Replacement Limited Qualification of
Designers
Testi / QCDefective Information
g/ QCOutsourcing
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Meeting Just for
Information Sharing
Meeting for Value
-Meetings 
- Creation/Problem +
Solving/Design Review
Limited Capability of 4
Tele-Conference
-------- -- Business Trip + - -
Spatial Barrier
Spend Time on Learning
How to Use Support 4
Equipments
Spend Time on Complex
Operation of support 4
Equipments
-- Supporting Outsourcees 4
Desire to Save
Information Releaser' s
Time
Intensive
Interaction' sHelpfulness
for Creating
Ideas/Problem
Solving/DR
Narrow Bandwidth of
Existing
Network(Resulting inLow
Resolution,Late
Response)
Preture IT Technology
Complex Organizational
Structure
Scattering locations
- Outrring
Complexity of Support
Equipments
Required Activity
3.Transportation
Outsourcing
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6 REWORK
6. Rework
Unplanned
Iteration
Root-Cause
PD's Nature(2)
Iteration cannot be
eliminated
Optimization Interface
Process Redesign PD's Nature(3)
Identifying All Interfaces
Upstream In Advance is Impossible
Poor Marketing
Poor Information Quality Information
from Upstream Phases Premature Concept
Design
Premature Architecture
Design
9.D3efective
Information
PD' s Nature(1)
Impossibility of completely clear Complete Elimination ofdiviionof lborRisks/
Uncertainties is
Unclear division Impossible
- Scattered Locations
Complex Organizational
-- Structure
Inability of Prompt Tardy Spatial/Structual
Adjustment of + Information Barrier Outsourcing
Division of Labor Transfer
Functional Organization
Complex Hierarchy
Structure of Organization
Prototype PoorVersion Work-in-Process VersionConfusion Management
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Creation of Low
Quality
Information
193
Scattered
Insufficient/ No SpatialLctin
Communication Barrier Complex
Organizational
Structure
Outsourcing J
Functional Organization
Complex Hierarchy
Structure of Organization
Schedule Too Tight Limited Resoumes (1)
Pressure (Unrealistic) System Over UtilizationSchedule
Highly Competitive
Market
oTimesinerdc
Way-Off Inadequate Scheduling
Schedule Technique
Insufficient
Training
Qualification Pna sllroc
Limited Resources (2)
Limited Qualification
of Designers
Troubleshooing /:Dagnosis
9. Defective
Working on Unreliable/ Information
Defective Informationt
_on Go to
"9. Defective
Information"
Failure to PD's Nature()Leaving Identify Complete Elimination of
Uncertainties 4-- Risks/ 4 
-- Risks/
/Risks Uncertainties Uncertainties is
Intact Early Impossible
couldBouned Rik-Thken Mssregey
Lack of Risk
Management
Risks Alarm High-level Unrealistic Highly-Competitive
Identified Suppressed Late al n Schedule (Market
Premature Vaiato
-Time-Sensitive Product
Limited Resources (1)
System Over Utilization
Corporate Culture(3)
Validation -Reluctance to
could Bounded .Accept Bad News
have been Rationality 4 Kill The Messenger"
Possible 
-Rs-aigSrtg
Poor Risk Management
Poor Risk Management]
Alarm NOT Inappropriate/ Lack of Solid Strategy
Suppressed Late Valiation (Tactics Only)
Premature Validatin
Skill
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Iteration Among
Remote Tasks Needs long time to get feedback
Wasteful ScOpizeNot
Planned
Iteration
Iteration
4--- Between .4
Adjacent Tasks
Iteration Among Slow Interaction Insufficient/ No Spat ial
Parallel Tasks Communication Barrier
Quick iteration: no or minimum
waiting time for feedback
Schedule Too Tight
Pressure + (Unrealistic) 4PressureSchedule
Way-Off
Schedule
Lack of
"Kento(chedking)"
Before Action
Scattered
Locations
Complex
Organizational
Structure
Outsourcing
Functional Organization
Complex Hierarchy
Structure of Organization
Limited Resources (1)
System Over Utilization
Highly Competitive
Market
Time-Sensitive Product
Technique
195
Complex Product
Architecture
With Excessive Interfaces
Benign or Good
PD's Nature(2)
Iteration cannot be
eliminated
196
7. RE-INVENTION
Temporal Barrier
Spatial/Structura
I Barrier
Contextual
Barrier
No system for Expertise Sharing
Existing System for Expertise
Sharing not Useful
-Takes Long Time for Inputting
-Takes Long Time for Seaching
Project Organization
(As opposed to Functional
Organization)
Scattered Locations
(Distributed Team)I
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Complex Organizational Structure
(Redundant Functions)
Designers'
Unwillingness to Share
Their Expertise
Outsourcing
*- Confidentiality of Expertise
Corporate Culture(1)
Designer's Try to Protect Their
Value By NOT Sharing Their
Expertise
Lack of Appropriate
Incentive/Measurement System
that Promotes Expertise Sharing
I
Root-Cause
I
I
I I
_Poor Expertise
Sharing
7. Re-invention +---
8. HAND-OFF
Unscheduled Hand-
Off
Unloading Tasks
on the Critical
Path
Switching to an
expert
Dissemination 
of
Requirements
Complex Product Design
-Scheduled Hand-Off +-+--
- Time-Sensitive Product
--- oWork Sharingt+---
-Intention to Level Workload
PD's Nature(1)
Complete Elimination of
Risks/Uncertainties is
Impossible
Limited Resources (2)
Limited Qualifications of
Designers
Absence of Task
Owner
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8. Hand-Off 4
OutsourcingI
Root-Cause
9. DEFECTIVE INFORAMTION
Information Predictable Poor
With Errors Knowledge
Errors Sharing
No System for Knowledge Sharing
Temporal Barrier Useless System for Knowledge
Sharing
-Takes Long Time for Inputting
-Takes Long Time for Searching
Scattered (Distributed) Locations
Spatial/
Structural
Barrier
Contextual
Barrier
Designers'
Unwillingness
to Share Their
Failure
Information
-4
-H
Confidentiality of Knowledge
Corporate Culture(2)
Failure are Likely To
be Blamed on Individuals
Lack of Appropriate
Incentive /Measurement
System that promotes
failure info. sharing
Limited Resources(1)
System Over Utilization
Local Over (Unrealistic Schedule)
Utilization
Poor Resource
Allocation
No Level Scheduling
Too Many_________
Lapses
Undetected Limited Resources (2)
Errors Limited Qualification
of Designers
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Project Organization
(As opposed to Functional Org.)
Complex Organizational
Structure
(Redundant Functions)
9. Defective
Information
Outsourcing
Root-Cause
I
I
Poor Resource
Allocation
Limited Resources (2)
Limited Qualification of
___ _ Primitive Designers
Errors
Limited Resources (3)
Designers' Limited
Experience in Similar
Projects
Poor Resource
Allocation
No System for Design
Review (DR)
By Experienced
Designers
No Effective Limited Resources(1)
Error Checking System Over Utilization
- No Leveled Scheduling
Utilization Limited Resources (2)
Limited Qualification of
Designers
Corporate Culture(3)
Reluctance to
Alarm Bounded Accept Bad News
Suppressed Rationality "Kill The Messenger"
- Risk-Taking Strategy
Poor Risk Management
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-- Unpredictable --
ErrorsP
Information
Deteriorated
-~ Through
Communication
Temrl Barri
Spatial/
Structural
Barrier
Contextual
Barrier
Highly Competitive
Market
High-level UnrealisticsitiveProduct
Schedule 
BPSchcdutPressure SceueLimited Resources (1)
System Over Utilization
Incremental Product
'ects Taken Development
ver from WPD's Nature()ious Models Complete Elimination
of Risks/
Uncertainties is
Impossible
er Batch Production
Sequential PD Process
Withoutinteractions
Complex Hierarchy
Structure of
Organization
Complex
Organizational
Structure
(Redundant Functions)
4 Functional
Organization
Scattered (Dispersed)
Locations
-Outsourcing
Confidentiality of
Knowledge
(BtoB)
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Complex Product
Lack of Modularity Architecture with
Excessive Interfaces
- Nature of the ProductComplexity of 4
incomplete h rdc Lack ofInformation Information Necessary
"Under- Wrongly Expertise
Processing" Perceived to
Information not be Complete
really complete Inappropriate/
- Insufficient/
Late Validation
Inexperience in theI business
Low Morale
Engineers
e ----- Neglect 4 Lack of Incentive
of Perfection
Corporate Culture
Risk-Takings
Limited Resources
(all)
Budget/ Expertise/
Qualification/ Facility
PID's Nature(1)
Complete Elimination
of Risks/
Uncertainties is
Impossible
Poor Risk Management
Lack of Solid Strategy
(Tactics Only)
Premature Validation
Skill
Too ightHighly CompetitiveToo ightMarket(Unrealistic) 4-
Schedule H Time-Sensitive Product
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Limited Resources(1)
Predure _System Over Utilization
- Pressure (Unrealistic Schedule)
Not Optimum Inadequate Scheduling
Schedule Technique
No System for
Expertise Sharing
Comm ication + TmprBr Existing System for
Expertise Sharing not
Useful
-Takes Long Time for
Inputting
-Takes Long Time for
Searching
Project Organization
(As opposed to
Functional
Organization)
Spatial/ Scattered Locations
Structural (Distributed Team)
Barrier
Complex
Organizational
Structure
(Redundant Functions)
outsourcing ]
Contextual Confidentiality of
Barrier Expertise
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Limited Resources(1)
System Over Utilization
Concurrent Engineering (2) (Unrealistic Schedule)
Information Pulled Highly Competitive
Overlapping f-T- Before Validation and/or - Marketof Tasks Optimization re
Releasing of oToo much concurrencyTentative 
- (complex product orInformation low-TRL)
Delay In the task Waste In Current
itselfTask
Delay in the Waste In Upstream
upstream tasks Task
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